Commercial Law Collides with Cyberspace:
The Trouble with Perfection - Insecurity
Interests in the New Corporate Asset by Nguyen, Xuan-Thao N.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 59 | Issue 1 Article 3
Winter 1-1-2002
Commercial Law Collides with Cyberspace: The
Trouble with Perfection - Insecurity Interests in the
New Corporate Asset
Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Conflict of Laws Commons, and the Intellectual
Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Commercial Law Collides with Cyberspace: The Trouble with Perfection -
Insecurity Interests in the New Corporate Asset, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 37 (2002),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol59/iss1/3
Commercial Law Collides with Cyberspace:
The Trouble with Perfection - Insecurity
Interests in the New Corporate Asset
Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen*
The recent downturn in the economy, particularly in the e-com-
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have extended loans to such e-companies obviously want to get
their hands on these bankrupt estates. Which creditor will have
priority in the new cybercollateral of domain names? The answer
to creditor priority questions may depend on whether domain names
are intangible propertyforpurposes ofsecured transactions. If so,
should security interests in domain names be perfected under the
Uniform Commercial Code or under federal law? This Article
asserts that domain names are a form of intangible property, and
that although they are not subject to the tort of conversion, they can
be used as collateral in secured transactions. This Article proposes
and evaluates two perfection schemes for security interests in
domain names. The first proposal follows the existing state-regu-
lated scheme through which creditors perfect their security interests
in domain names byfiling afinancing statement with the applicable
state filing office. The second proposal is a federal-based scheme
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names by electronically filing afinancing statement with a domain
name registrar who will record the security interest information
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. Introduction
Picture this scenario: As counsel for several venture capital firms in
the New Economy, you had been enjoying the ride of the explosive growth
of e-commerce in the last few years. You have assisted your venture capi-
tal (VC) clients in funding their ventures in e-companies whose primary
cyberassets are domain names such as sex.com, business.com, loans.com,
jewelry.com, and stock.com. E-companies have bought business.com for $7.5
million,1 jewelry.com for $5 million,2 and loans.com for $3 million. Others
have estimated that sex.com is worth $250 million4 and that stock.com is
1. See Greg Johnson, The Costly Gamefor Net Names, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at Al
(reporting purchase of domain name business.com for $7.5 million in stock and cash).
2. See Silvia Sansoni, It Was Good While It Lasted: Internet Hotshots Reflect on Where
All the Money Went, FORBES, Dec. 25, 2000, at 36 (reporting that Richard Caniglia, V.P. of
Operations for Miadom.com and online jewelry retailer for Online Jewelry, recalled that his
company "bought a company that was little more than a URL - Jewelry.corn - for $5 million").
3. See Cynthia Flash, Are They Cybersquatters or Cyberentrepreneurs?, CMP TECH-
WEB, July 20,2000, available at 2000 WL 2667397 (reporting that loans.com was sold to Bank
of America for $3 million, that beautiful.com is on sale at $3 million, and that flu.com is on
market for $1.4 million).
4. Martin Kady, Sex.com Fight Rages: Lots ofMoney at Stake in Valuable Web Name,
SAN JOSE AND SILICON VA=IY Bus. J., Aug. 18, 2000, at 3 (noting that domain name sex.com
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worth $7.5 million.' Trademark law does not protect these domain names
because they are generic terms.6 Nevertheless, as indicated by the prices paid,
these generic domain names are highly valuable commodities that are sought
after in the New Economy.7
Lately, the slowdown of the economy and the continuous adjustment of
the stock market are causing your clients some discomfort! Your VC clients'
investments in e-companies are not performing well, and investors are not
pouring currency into incubation projects as they once did.9 Many financing
is reportedly worth $250 million); Jon Swartz, Sexcom Ownership Ruling Expected, Domain
Name Hotly Disputed, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2000, at 3B (stating that domain name sex.corn is
estimated to be worth around $250 million). Sexcom was estimated during litigation to be
worth $250 million. See httpJ/www.submerged-ideas.com/valuation/topdomainsales.htm (last
visited Feb. 15, 2002) (noting valuation of sexcom).
5. See Simon Brooke, Be Master of Your Own Domain, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar.
15, 2001, at 70, available at 2001 WL 15593636 (reporting that stock.corn is available for sale
at $7.5 million); Nick Wingfield, The Game of the Name, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1999, at R14
(reporting that bingo.com sold for $1.1 million, drugs.com sold for $823,456, and univer-
sity.com sold for $530,000).
6. See Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (noting that
dormant domain names are unprotected by trademark law); see also Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen,
Shifling the Paradigm in E-Commerce: Move Over Inherently Distinctive Trademarks, The E-
brand, I-brand and Generic Domain NamesAscending to Power?, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 937,965-
66 (2001) (arguing that generic domain names are not entitled to trademark protection).
7. Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999) (noting that generic domain
names have significant market value).
8. See, e.g., Chris Gaither, Intel Plans Broad Measures to Cut Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
21, 2001, at C6 (stating that "Intel joins the growing list of technology companies tightening
their belts as their business markets, booming only a year ago, grow increasingly uncertain");
Saul Hansell, Some Hard Lessons for Online Grocer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2001, at C1 (ex-
plaining that online grocer Webvan has spent $1 billion struggling to survive and that investors
are unwilling to invest additional money until Webvan obtains profitability); Saul Hansell,
Yahoo Warns on Sales, andIts Chief Resigns, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 8, 2001, at Cl (reporting that
market for Internet advertising is disappearing, sending Yahoo's sales to their lowest level since
end of 1999); Jennifer S. Lee, Discarded Dreams of Dot-Con Rejects, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21,
2001, at CI (reporting wave of dot-corn layoffs); Floyd Norris, What Were Once Ladders Are
Now Chutes: A Return to Earth for the Stock Class of 2000, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,2001, at C1
(noting that shares of seventy-seven IPO's debuting from January 31 to March 10, 2000, were
valued at $25.9 billion combined as of March 10, 2000, but were worth only $5.3 billion as of
March 7,2001).
9. See Sansoni, supra note 2, at 36 (interviewing chief executive for internet software
company who noted that his company had recently "produced two products that were loved by
potential clients but not loved by investors... [I]nvestors would say: 'Call me when the Nasdaq
gets over 4500.'"). Sansoni also interviewed Richard Fuller, founder of PropertyOps.om, an
online services for property managers that lasted for nine months. Id. Fuller recalled that the
site had been active for just six weeks when it ran out of cash. PropertyOps failed
because we raised only $750,000 - had we raised $2.5 million we would be
profitable today. The heartbreaking thing was the wealth dried up. Every time
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projects that you have started on behalf of your clients are now on the back
burner.
Your office telephone is ringing, and you quickly glance at the caller ID
display. It is a call from one of your VC clients. The client asks: "Will we
have a chance to salvage any of the cyberassets? Who will get the domain
names? What will happen to the proceeds of the sale of the cyberassets in the
event that some of the e-companies are heading toward bankruptcy?" You do
not have any answers, but you promise your client that you will look into the
matter further.
You search your gray cells. You recall that most, if not all, the e-deals
were equity-based investments, not secured transactions as in the Old Econ-
omy. You are sweating a little bit because you honestly do not know whether
your client had a security interest in the domain names and whether such secu-
rity interest even was perfected. You rush to the library and look up a treatise
on secured transactions. Words like "personal property,"'" "attachment,""
we had a term sheet and a handshake, the market would drop 400 points and
investors would pull out.
Id. Similarly, Michael Shields, founder of OnlineOffice.com, recalled in his interview with
Sansoni:
I was trying to raise money in April. I had back-to-back meetings scheduled with
investment bankers, and if the Nasdaq was down, only a junior guy would show
up; when it bounced back, the top level people would attend. Things changed by
the hour. At 9 a.m. they wanted to invest By 3 they weren't doing any more dot-
corns.
Id.
10. Personal property that can be used as collateral for secured transactions under the
revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code includes goods, documents of title, instru-
ments (such as promissory notes), chattel paper, investment property (such as securities entitle-
ments, securities accounts, commodity contracts, and commodity accounts), crops, fixtures,
accounts, deposit accounts, payment intangibles, and general intangibles (such as copyrights,
patents, trademarks, and associated goodwill). See U.C.C. § 9-102 (2001) (setting out defini-
tions of various personal property used as collateral); U.C.C. § 9-109(a) (2001) (providing
scope of Article 9). All citations are to the recently revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, unless indicated otherwise.
11. Attachment is the process by which the security interest in favor of the creditor
becomes effective against the debtor. See U.C.C. § 9-203(a) (2001) (describing attachment
process). The security interest is attached to collateral when the following steps are met:
1. A security agreement (the contract between the creditor and the debtor wherein the
debtor grants the creditor security interests in the collateral) must be authenticated by
the debtor,
2. The security agreement must provide a description of the collateral;
3. The creditor must give value (usually a loan or credit) to the debtor, and
4. The debtor must have rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the
collateral to the creditor.
See U.C.C. § 9-203(a) & (b) (2001) (listing necessary preconditions to enforcement of security
interest).
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"perfection,"12 "financing statement,"13 and "collateral1 4 leap out at you. You
wonder whether domain names are personal property for the purposes of
secured transactions under state commercial law statutes. You are sweating
a little bit more.
The above scenario highlights some of the new problems concerning
secured transactions in e-commerce and how the characteristics of e-com-
merce alter the traditional valuation of corporate assets." Indeed, in the New
Economy the normative tangible form of assets such as corporate headquar-
ters, branch offices, warehouses, land, equipment, and inventories are not the
assets typically owned by Internet companies. 6 Instead, dueto the cyberspace
nature of these companies, most of their value consists of intangible assets
that include domain names, trademarks, patents, patent applications, copy-
rights, and proprietary information." The recent downturn of the e-commerce
12. Perfection is the process by which the creditor's security interest becomes effective
against other creditors, lien holders, and bankruptcy trustees. The most common means of
perfecting a security interest is by filing a financing statement in the appropriate place, such as
the office of the secretary of state. See U.C.C. § 9-310 (2001) (requiring that financing state-
ment must be filed to perfect most security interests). Article 9 also provides other methods of
perfection, such as having creditors take physical possession of the collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-
313 (2001) (describing circumstances in which security interest can be perfected by taking
possession of collateral). If a security interest is perfected, it is senior to most later creditor
interests. See U.C.C. § 9-322 (2001) (describing priority of perfected security interests over
later perfected or unperfected security interests).
13. A financing statement is a record containing information, such as the name of the
debtor, the name of the secured creditor, and an indication of the collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-
502(a) (2001) (listing required contents of financing statement). A financing statement serves
as a notice that "indicates merely that a person may have a security interest in the collateral
indicated. Further inquiry from the parties concerned will be necessary to disclose the complete
state of affairs." U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 2 (2001).
14. "'Collateral' means the property subject to a security interest or agricultural lien. The
term includes: (A) proceeds to which a security interest attaches; (B) accounts, chattel paper,
payment intangibles, and promissory notes that have been sold; and (C) goods that are subject
of a consignment" U.C.C. § 9-102(12) (2001).
15. Perhaps the above scenario is another example of both how the development of cyber-
space challenges and tests current legal boundaries and how it will continue to do so. See, e.g.,
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, (National) Trademark Laws and the (Non-National) Domain Name
System, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 495,496-97 (2000) (noting that conflict between trademark
law and domain name regulatory systems is one of several cyberspace challenges to current legal
boundaries).
16. See William F. Alderman & John Kanberg, Due Diligence in the Securities Litigation
Reform Era: Practical Tips from Litigators on the Effective Conduct Documentation and De-
fense of Underwriter Investigation, 1176 PLI/CORP 177,208 (2000) (observing that many start-
up Internet companies lack "significant physical assets such as manufacturing facilities or
inventory").
17. See id. at 207-08 (observing that Internet companies "have a large portion of their
value tied to intangible assets," particularly "intangible intellectual property"); Majorie Chertok
& Warren E. Agin, Restart cor: Identiging, Securing and Maximizing the Liquidation Value
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sector has revealed that for most Internet companies filing for bankruptcy, the
most valuable remaining assets are intangible assets."8 Often, domain names
are the only remaining valuable assets, tangible or intangible, as these Internet
companies approach insolvency.' 9
As bankruptcy trustees and creditors glimpse the bankruptcy estate, funda-
mental questions of security interests in domain names and perfection of such
interests must be resolved prior to any attempt to determine priority of conflict-
ing interests in the cyber-assets, particularly domain names. Specifically, are
domain names personal property that can be used to secure payment and
performance of an obligation? If so, what method of perfection should be
employed for securitization of domain names? This Article will address these
issues and will propose two methods for perfection of security interests in
domain names.
Part II will discuss the general perfection schemes under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the possible federal preemption of
state regulations concerning perfection of security interests in certain types of
intangible property.20 Part III further examines the uneasy existence of both
state and federal law on perfection of security interests in intangible corporate
assets, such as trademarks, 2' and suggests that the perfection mechanism for
of Cyber-Assels in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 255, 261-62 (2000)
(observing that "[ulnlike typical brick and mortar companies the assets of the typical Internet
company are often 'virtual' consisting of intellectual property such as trademarks, trade names,
copyrights, and patents, and general intangibles"); Scott J. Driza, Perfecting Security Interests
in Intellectual Property, 88 ILL. B. J. 162, 162 (2000) (noting that intellectual property is only
valuable collateral owned by many upstart companies); E. Lee Reichert, Mergers and Acquisi-
tions in a Dot.com World, 29 COLO. LAW. 37, 39 (2000) (observing that intellectual property
constitutes large portion of value of companies that conduct significant portions of their business
activity on Internet); Robert P. Simons, Back to Earth From Cyberspace: Dealing with Business
Failure oflnternet Companies, NEV. LAW., June 8,2000, at 12 (noting that "internet company's
assets are intangible in nature and include intellectual property"); Charles Szurgot, Disclosure,
Intellectual Capital and Value in the Internet Age, WallStreetlawyer.com: Security in the
Electronic Age, June 1999, available at WL 3 No. I GLWSLAW 7 (noting that Internet
companies "derive an increasingly large percentage of value from intangible assets and intellec-
tual capital, like brand names, patents and customer loyalty").
18. See Chertok & Agin, supra note 17, at 296 (describing liquidation of bankrupt Boo.
coin, whose most marketable assets were technology, intellectual property, and customer lists);
A. Mechele Dickerson, From Jeans to Genes: The Evolving Nature of Property of the Estate,
15 BANKR. DEV. J. 285, 298 (1999) (observing difficulty bankruptcy courts will soon face in
determining value of cybercompany estates, which consist largely of "intangible cyberassets").
19. See Julie Pitta, The Undertaker, FoRBES, Dec. 25, 2000, at 62 (reporting that only
remaining assets of bankrupt dot-coins are usually "a domain name and a few chairs").
20. See infra notes 32-58 and accompanying text (discussing UCC's perfection scheme
and whether federal law preempts perfection of security interests in intangible assets).
21. See infra notes 60-93 and accompanying text (explaining dual federal and state per-
fection schemes for intangible corporate property such as trademarks).
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security interests in trademarks may provide some guidance to the formation
of a perfection scheme for security interests in domain names.22
Unlike the perfection of security interests in trademarks, an attempt
to securitize domain names encounters the troublesome issue of proper class-
ification of domain names. Is a domain name a creature of the contract
for services between the domain name registrar and the registrant? Is a
domain name legal property? Is there a property interest in domain names?
Part IV will examine the commercial treatment of domain names in the open
market as well as relevant federal statutes and judicial opinions relating
to domain names in an attempt to ascertain whether domain names are "per-
sonal property" for purposes of secured transactions under Article 9 of the
UCC.
23
Part V will propose two methods of perfection of security interests in
domain names. The first proposal would involve a state-regulated scheme
through which creditors perfect their security interests in domain names by
filing a financing statement with the applicable state filing office.2 The
second proposal would create a scheme, based in federal law, through which
creditors perfect their security interests in domain names by electronically
filing a financing statement with a domain name registrar who then records
the security interest information with the WHOIS database.' The Part con-
cludes by evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of each method.26
ff. Perfection and Federal Preemption
State law historically has governed secured transactions involving per-
sonal property.27 Prior to the promulgation of Article 9 of the UCC in 1962,
creditors relied on security devices such as pledges, "chattel mortgages, condi-
tional sales, trust receipts, factor's liens, and assignments of accounts receiv-
22. See infra notes 94-123 and accompanying text (examining how trademark perfection
schemes might provide models for development of domain name perfection schemes).
23. See infra notes 168-249 and accompanying text (considering whether domain names
are "personal property" under Article 9 of UCC).
24. See infra note 250-68 and accompanying text (proposing state-regulated perfection
scheme for security interests in domain names).
25. See infra notes 269-80 and accompanying text (proposing federal perfection scheme).
26. See infra notes 281-87 and accompanying text (examining relative strengths and
weaknesses of federal and state preemption schmes).
27. See Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory Institu-
tionalization of Securitization, 33 CONN. L. REv. 199,202-03 (2000) (discussing common law
and state statutes that govemed pre-UCC secured transactions); see also Shubha Ghosh, The
Morphing of Property Rules and Liability Rules: An Intellectual Property Optimist Examines
Article 9 andBankruptcy, 8 FORDHAMINTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 99,110 (1997) (noting
that Article 9 of UCC is primary source of state law governing secured credit).
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able."2 Such security devices were ineffective, confusing, and failed to pro-
mote commercial financing. 29 The original version of Article 9 replaced such
pre-UCC devices.30 Article 9 went through its first revision in 1972 and was
most recently revised in 1999, with the changes becoming effective on July 1,
2001.31
Article 9 governs any "transaction, regardless of form, that creates a
security interest in personal property... by contract. 0 2 "A security interest
is an interest in personal property. . . which secures payment or performance
of an obligation. '33 Such interest, however, does not amount to a transfer of
title in the personal property. 4 Parties generally accomplish perfection of
28. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (1972) (stating that "[tihis Article sets out a comprehensive
scheme for the regulation of security interests in personal property and fixtures. It supersedes
prior legislation dealing with such security devices as chattel mortgages, conditional sales, trust
receipts, factor's liens and assignments of accounts receivable."); Lupica, supra note 27, at 202-
03 (noting types of devices used pre-UCC); see also In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc., 239 B.R. 917,
920 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (noting that "[b]efore the adoption of the UCC, a variety of personal
property security devices were used, including chattel mortgages, that placed title in the mort-
gagee").
29. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (1972) (noting history of Article 9's development). The
1972 version of the Official Comment to § 9-101 states:
The growing complexity of financing transactions forced legislatures to keep piling
new statutory provisions on top of our inadequate and already sufficiently compli-
cated nineteenth-century structure of security law.. The results of this continuing
development were increasing costs to both parties and increasing uncertainty as to
their rights and the rights of third parties dealing with them. The aim of this Article
is to provide a simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of
present-day secured financing transactions can go forward with less cost and with
greater certainty.
Id.; see also Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea & the Uniform Commercial Code:
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 620 (1981) (observing that "[p]re-
Code personal property security law may be described as closely resembling that obscure wood
in which Dante discovered the gates of hell"); Lupica, supra note 27, at 203 (describing pre-
Article 9 patchwork of laws governing secured transactions and resulting inefficiency and
uncertainty).
30. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing security devices replaced by
Article 9 of UCC).
31. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (2001) (explaining historical background ofArticle 9); U.C.C.
§ 9-101 cmt. (1972) (same); see also Robert E. Scott, The Politics ofArtice 9, 80 VA. L. REV.
1783, 1785-87 (1994) (discussing "connections between the institutional frame work of the
U.C.C. and the substantive provisions of Article 9" that facilitated development of Article 9).
32. U.C.C. § 9-109 (2001).
33. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (2001).
34. See U.C.C. § 9-315(aXI) (providing that security interest "continues in collateral
notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition thereof unless the secured
party authorized the disposition free of the security interest"); see also In re Cybernetic Servs.,
Inc., 239 B.R. 917, 920 (BA.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (noting that "UCC created a single security
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security interests in personal property serving as collateral for commercial
transactions by filing a financing statement describing36 or indicating the
collateral37 with the appropriate state offices.'
Article 9 divides collateral into different categories such as goods, quasi-
tangible property, and intangible property. It further subdivides goods into
consumer goods, equipment, farm products, and inventory;39 quasi-tangible
property into instruments, investment property, documents, and chattel paper;
and intangible property into accounts, deposit accounts, general intangibles,
health-care receivables, and payment intangibles.4 The classification of
collateral is important because Article 9 requires different technical steps to
perfect41 security interests for different types of collateral.42
The general intangible category is a catch-all category for personal prop-
erty not belonging to any other category of collateral. 43 Trademarks, copy-
device, which was not dependent on who had title to the property .... Because transferring
title no longer has significance in creating a security interest in personal property, most security
interests created after adoption of the UCC do not involve the transfer of title.").
35. See U.C.C. § 9-310 (2001) (providing general rule that, subject to exceptions, "a
financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests").
36. See U.C.C. § 9-504 (2001) (stating that "financing statement sufficiently indicates the
collateral that it covers if the financing statement provides: (1) a description of the collateral
pursuant to Section 9-108(b)"). U.C.C. § 9-108(b) (2001) states that:
a description of collateral reasonably identifies the collateral if it identifies the collateral
by: (1) specific listing; (2) category, (3)... a type of collateral defined in the Uniform
Commercial Code; (4) quantity, (5) computational or allocational formula or procedure;
or (6) . .. any other method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable.
Id.
37. See U.C.C. § 9-504 (2001) (stating that "financing statement sufficiently indicates the
collateral that it covers if the financing statement provides: (1) a description of the collateral...
or (2) an indication that the financing statement covers all assets or all personal property").
38. See U.C.C. § 9-501 (2001) (listing filing offices for perfection of various types of
security interests).
39. See U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 4a (2001) (listing "the four mutually-exclusive 'types' of col-
lateral that consist of goods: 'consumer goods,' 'equipment,' 'farm products,' and 'inventory"').
40. See U.C.C. § 9-102 & cmt. (2001) (providing definitions and classifications of collat-
eral).
41. See supra note 12 (defining perfection).
42. See U.C.C. § 9-309 (2001) (listing types of security interests that can be perfected by
attachment), U.C.C. § 9-310 (2001) (requiring filing of financing statement as most common
method for perfecting security interests in majority of collateral property, but noting excep-
tions); U.C.C. § 9-313 (2001) (permitting secured party to perfect certain security interests by
taking possession of collateral property); U.C.C. § 9-314 (2001) (providing perfection of
security interest by control of investment property, deposit accounts, letter of credit rights, and
electronic chattel paper).
43. See U.C.C. § 9-102(aX42) & cmt. 5d (2001) (defining general intangible personal
property).
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rights, and patents do not fall into any category of intangibles and, thus, are
in the residual category of general intangibles under Article 9.44 Indeed, the
Official Comment to UCC § 9-102 indicates that general intangibles include
"various categories of intellectual property" and "rights that arise under a
license of intellectual property."4"
Although perfection of security interests in collateral generally is achieved
by compliance with state filing requirements,4 federal law governs the perfec-
tion of security interests in certain types of general intangible collateral, such
as registered copyrights.47 Section 9-109(c) specifically indicates that Article
9 "does not apply to the extent that a statute, regulation, or treaty of the United
States preempts this article."4 However, this preemption exists only to the
extent mandated by federal law.49
Furthermore, section 9-311 (a)(1) provides that the filing of a financing
statement is not effective to perfect a security interest in property that is sub-
ject to a federal statute "whose requirements for a security interest's obtaining
priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the property preempt
section 9-310(a). 0 As the Official Comment to section 9-311 notes, Article
44. See U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5d (2001) (defining general intangibles as residual category
of personal property).
45. See id. (explaining that general intangibles serve as residual category of personal
property). Comment 5(d) states that
"[g]eneral intangible" is the residual category of personal property, including things in
action, that is not included in the other defined types of collateral. Examples are various
categories of intellectual property .... As used in the definition of "general intangible,"
"things in action" includes rights that arise under a license of intellectual property,
including the right to exploit the intellectual property without liability for infringement.
Id.
46. See U.C.C. § 9-310 (2001) (providing general rule of perfection by filing).
47. The recent trend in case law indicates that courts require a filing with the Copyright
Office for perfection of security interests in registered copyrights and a UCC-1 financing state-
ment filed with the appropriate state office for perfection of security interests in unregistered
copyrights. See e.g., Aerocon Eng'g, Inc. v. Silicon Valley Bank (In re World Auxiliary Power
Co.), 244 B.R. 149, 153 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1999) (concluding that "a security interest in an
unregistered copyright may be perfected by filing a UCC-1 financing statement with the UCC
Office"); Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Zenith Prods., Ltd. (In re AEG Acquisition
Corp.), 127 B.R. 34,40-41 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (finding that Copyright Act preempts UCC
for security interests in copyrights and that perfection of registered copyrights requires that
security interests must be recorded with United States Copyright Office).
48. U.C.C. § 9-109(c) (2001).
49. See Steven 0. Weise, The Financing of Intellectual Property Under Revised UCC
Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1077, 1080 n.7 (1999) (observing that "section 9-109(c)(1)
makes clear that Article 9 defers to federal intellectual property law only 'to the extent' that
federal law in fact preempts Article 9").
50. U.C.C. § 9-311(aXl) (20 01).
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9 exempts from the filing provision5' 'transactions as to which a system of
filing... has been established under federal law. '52 When "such a system
exists, perfection of a relevant security interest can be achieved only through
compliance with that system.'"53 The Official Comment mentions civil aircraft
as an example of the type of property subject to federal statutes that effec-
tively preempt Article 9 filing provisions.5 4 On the other hand, the Official
Comment lists the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940 as an example of a
federal statute that "provides for notice to contracting and disbursing officers
and to sureties on bonds but does not establish a national filing system and
therefore is not within the scope of' section 9-311 (a)(1) preemption."
Analyzing both sections 9-109 and 9-311 suggests that federal preemp-
tion of state perfection schemes will occur only if the pertinent federal statte
requires the preemption and such law provides a national filing system for
perfection of the relevant security interests.5 6 How courts analyze the recently
revised sections of Article 9 in relation to intangible property governed by
federal law such as copyrights, patents, and trademarks remains to be seen.
Nevertheless, courts largely already have resolved the question of whether
federal trademark law preempts state regulations of security interests in
trademarks," albeit under the former Article 9.58
51. See U.C.C. § 9-310 (2001) (providing general rule and exceptions to perfection by
filing).
52. U.C.C. § 9-311 cmt. 2 (2001).
53. Id.
54. See U.C.C. § 9-311 cmt. 2 (2001) (listing civil aircraft as example of type of property
preempted by federal statute).
55. Id.
56. See Weise, supra note 49, at 1080 n.7 (stating that Article 9 acknowledges federal
preemption only to extent required by federal law). In his treatise, Bankruptcy Judge William
L. Norton, Jr., states:
The 1999 revision to UCC Article 9 changes the applicable preemption rules. The
revised Article 9's provisions do not apply "to the extent that" a statute, regulation,
or treaty of the United States preempts the provision. Federal law thus preempts
revised Article 9 only to the extent required by the Federal law, not in its entirety
when the subject matter of the security interest is subject to other law.
WLUAML.NORTON,JR.,NRTONBANKRUPTCYLAwANDPRACTICE2D § 151:18 (2d ed. Supp.
2001).
57. See Am.'s Hobby Ctr. v. Hudson United Bank (In re Am. Hobby Ctr.), 223 B.R. 275,
286 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that "to date there has been little dissent regarding security
interests in trademarks; the consensus is that they are controlled by state UCC law" (quoting
Alice Haemmerfi, Insecurity Interests: Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law
Collide, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1645, 1656 (1996))).
58. Former Article 9 provides two relevant provisions pertaining to federal preemption
and exception to perfection by fling: Former section 9-104(a) provides that Article 9 is inap-
plicable to "a security interest subject to any statute of the United States, to the extent that such
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II Perfection of Security Interests in Trademarks
Trademarks are words, phrases, logos, symbols, or devices that are used
in association with goods or services to function as source identifiers. 9 No
longer the latest form of corporate assets,'e trademarks have become a well-
established component of corporate value."1 Many trademarks are highly
valued,62 and, not surprisingly, many companies utilize them as collateral in
commercial financing.63
Under trademark law, the trademark owner does not "own" the words,
phrases, logos, symbols, or devices that have been functioning as source
statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties affected by transactions in particular
types of property.- U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (2000). Former section 9-302(3) states that UCC filing
is not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to. . . a
statute or treaty of the United States which provides for a national or international
registration or a national or international certificate of title or which specifies a place
of filing different from that specified in this Article for filing of the security interest.
U.C.C. § 9-302(3) (2000). Former section 9-302(4) further states that "[c]ompliance with a
statute or treaty described in subsection (3) is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement
under this Article, and a security interest in property subject to the statute or treaty can be per-
fected only by compliance therewith." U.C.C. § 9-302(4) (2000).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) (defining trademarks).
60. See Lisa M. Vaccaro, Security Interests in Intellectual Property: Towards a Unified
System of Perfection, 6 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 215, 216 (1993) (noting that beginning in 1960s
corporate assets expanded to include intangible intellectual property).
61. See, e.g., JULIUs R. LUNSFORD, JR., GOOD WILLIN TRADEMARKs: COCA-COLA AND
COKE, TiE COcA-COLA BoTT.ER 27 (1955) ("The production plants and inventories of The
Coca-Cola Company could go up in flames overnght .... Yet, on the following morning, there
is not a bank... that would not lend this Company the funds necessary for rebuilding, accepting
as security only the inherent goodwill in its trademarks 'Coca-Cola' and 'Coke.'").
62. See Discussion, Trademark Vigilance in the Twenty-First Century: A Pragmatic Ap-
proach, 9 FORDRAM INTEu.. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 823, 827 (1999) (quoting panelist Bret
Parker, Colgate-Palmolive Senior Trademark & Copyright Counsel and noting that Colgate
trademark has been appraised at $4.4 billion); Industry Calls for Stiffer Enforcement of Anti-
Counterfeiting Laws Abroad, 44 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA), Oct 1, 1992, at 585,
586 (observing that Coca-Cola trademark is valued at $24 billion and Pampers is valued at $6
billion); Russell L. Parr, The Value of Trademarks, C913 A.L.I-A.BA. 229, 235 (1994)
(estimating value of Marlboro trademark at $52 billion); Allison Sell McDade, Note, Trading
in Trademarks - Why the Anti-Assignment in Gross Doctrine Should be Abolished When
Trademarks Are Used as Collateral, 77 TEX. L. REv. 465,465 (1998) (observing that McDon-
ald's trademark was estimated as being worth $20 billion and Nike, Kellogg, and AT&T
trademarks are estimated at $11 billion each).
63. See, e.g., EH Yacht, L.L.C. v. Egg Harbor, L.L.C., 84 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566 (D. N.J.
2000) (noting "the well-established rule that creditors may name trademarks as valuable collat-
eral securing repayment of loans"); LiT Red Barn, Inc. v. Red Barn Sys., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 98,
106-07 (N.D. Ind. 1970) (upholding as valid trademark assignment that provided for reassign-
ment of trademark to assignor if assignee defaulted).
COMMERCLIL LAW COLLIDES WIH CYBERSPA CE
identifiers.' Rather, the trademark owner has the right to enjoin others from
using a substantially similar trademark that is likely to cause confusion in the
mind of the consumer.6 Though trademarks are a form of intellectual prop-
erty and have become very valuable corporate assets, trademarks cannot be
assigned, transferred, or traded without the attached goodwill.66 This rule of
anti-assignment in gross of a trademark prohibits judgment creditors from
levying upon and selling a judgment debtor's trademarks without the associ-
ated good will.6 7
Although trademarks and their associated goodwill are used as collateral
in secured transactions, perfection of security interests in such intangible
property is ambiguous due to the potential conflicts between the Lanham Act,
which governs federal trademarks,s and the UCC. 69 The ambiguity has been
64. Trademark rights are based on use. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.,
248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (concluding that trademark rights arise only from use of trademark in
connection with existing business or trade); Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir.
1998) (noting that to assert trademark rights, mark must be used in commerce).
65. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (1994) (providing that injunctive relief is available to
owner of infringed trademark rights); Washington Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Auths.,
Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 496,498 (E.D. Va. 1999) (finding that trademark owner had right to enjoin
unauthorized use of trademarks as domain names but no ownership rights in such domain
names).
66. See Adams Apple Distrib. Co. v. Papeleras Reunidas, SA., 773 F.2d 925, 931 (7th
Cir. 1985) (noting "that a trademark is not a property right in gross which may be sold apart
from the business or goodwill with which the trademark has been associated"); Marshak v.
Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding that "sale of a trade name or mark
divorced from its goodwill" is invalid "assignment in gross"); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:2 (4th ed. 200 1) (discussing rule
that "trademark cannot be assigned apart from the good will it symbolizes").
67. See 30 AM. JUR. 2D Executions and Enforcement ofJudgmens § 160 (1994) (stating
that "trademark is not a property right in gross which may be sold apart from the business or
good will with which the trademark has been associated. Thus, a judgment creditor may not
levy upon and sell a judgment debtor's registered service mark or trademark.").
68. Trademarks are governed by both common law and the Lanham Act. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994) (providing federal trademark law); see also Judith L. Church,
Intellectual Property Aspects of Corporate Acquisitions, SF14 ALI-ABA 323, 336 (2000)
(comparing U.S. trademark law with trademark law of civil law countries); Dan McCuaig, Hahe
the Baby: An Obvious Solution to the Troubling Use of Trademarks as Metatags, 18 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 643, 648-49 (2000) (stating that trademark infringement
test is "the same for both common law trademark infringement actions and federal trademark
infringement actions under the Lanham Act"); Patricia V. Norton, Note, The Effect of Article
I Obis of the Paris Convention on American Unfair Competition Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 225,
227 (1999) (noting that prior to Lanham Act, common law completely provided unfair competi-
tion law).
69. See In re Together Dev. Corp., 227 B.R. 439,442 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) (noting that
trademark statute is vague, causing understandable confusion as to perfection of security
interests in trademarks); see also Thomas L. Bahrick, Security Interests in Intellectual Property,
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a subject of debate during the last fifteen years.70 While some commentators
believe that perfection of security interests in trademarks is governed by
federal statutes,7 others assert that the UCC still controls perfection schemes
for trademarks. 2 A few commentators have even advocated dual filings in a
state filing office and in the United States Patent and Trademark Office to
place third parties on notice of the security interests in trademark collateral."
15 AIPLA Q.J. 30, 37 (1987) (observing confusion as to whether UCC or federal law governs
perfection of security interests in intellectual property); Harold R. Weinberg & William J.
Woodward, Jr., Easing Transfer and Security Interest Transactions in Intellectual Property:
AnAgendaforReform, 79 KY. L.J. 61,73 (1990-91) (discussing statutory and conceptual "gulf"
between state and federal law relating to use of intellectual property as collateral).
70. See Vaccaro, supra note 60, at 234-35 (discussing ABA Task Force on Security Inter-
ests in Intellectual Property and its proposals for clarifying laws governing perfection of intel-
lectual property security interests); Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 69, at 93-94 (discussing
ambiguity, surveying other reform proposals, and offering new proposal). See generally
Haemmerli, supra note 57 (reviewing concerns relating to perfection schemes for intellectual
property, critiquing proposals advanced by other commentators, and suggesting alternative
approaches). Until very recently, the debate involved the former Article 9 and its two relevant
provisions pertaining to federal preemption and exceptions to perfection by filing. See supra
note 58 for a description of the relevant former provisions, sections 9-104(a) and 9-302. For
an argument that dual filings in both the Copyright Office and a state's UCC filing office would
perfect security interests in both registered and unregistered copyrights, see generally Jeffrey
R. Capwel, Note, Secured Financing in Intellectual Property: Perfection of Security Interests
in Copyrights to Computer Programs, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1041 (1988).
71. See Marci Levine Klumb, Note, Perfection of Security Interests in Intellectual Prop-
erty: FederalStatutes PreemptArticle 9,57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 135, 138-39 (1988) (contend-
ing that Lanham Act, Patent Act, and Copyright Act preempt UCC perfection schemes).
72. See Thomas S. Hemmendinger, Perfecting Security Interests in Intellectual Prop erty,
35 R.I.B.J., Nov. 1986, at 8 (contending that UCC governs perfection of security interests in
unregistered trademarks).
73. See Lee G. Meyer et al., Intellectual Property in Today 'sFinancingMarket, 19 MAR
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 20-21 (Mar. 2000) (stating that to perfect trademark security interests,
"assignment[s] should be (1) filed in the PTO reciting the goodwill language described above,
(2) filed as a UCC financing statement in the appropriate jurisdiction reciting the elements of the
business associated with the trademark, and (3) if they exist filed in compliance with any state
trademark requirements"); Raymond T. Nimmer, An Update on Financing with Intellectual
Property as Collateral: Part I offl, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., Oct. 1997, at 2,10 (noting that "a dual
filing is the safest route for perfecting security interests in trademarks"); see also Roman
Cleanser Co. v. Nat'l Acceptance Co. of Am. (In re Roman Cleanser Co.), 43 B.R. 940, 945-46
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) (noting complicated procedures for perfection of security interests in
trademarks proposed by various commentators (citing RUDOLF CALLMAN, UNFAIRCOMPETI"ION,
TRADEMARKS AND MOCNOPOUiS, § 19.62 (4th ed. 1983); Bahrick, supra note 69, at 45 (recom-
mending that secured party make both federal and state filings); Handler & Lin, How to Perfect
Security Interests in Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, 11 U.C.C.L.J. 346, 352-53 (1978))),
affd on other grounds, 802 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986); Vacarro, supra note 60, at 231 (advising
lenders "to record their security interests in trademarks under the Lanham Act and under the
uCC").
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Despite such disagreement among commentators, judicial opinions remain
relatively uniform in the perfection scheme for security interests in trade-
marks." Courts have consistently held thatthe UCC governs such perfection."
The federal Lanham Act controls only the assignment of trademarks and not
security interests in trademarks." Federal trademark law, in other words, does
not preempt state regulations on perfection of security interests in trademarks.
Federal law preempts state law when state law conflicts with federal law,
when state law would frustrate a federal scheme, or when Congress clearly
intended to occupy the field." Congress's failure to define assignment in
federal trademark law casts doubt on whether the assignment of a trademark
74. See In re Together Dev. Corp., 227 B.R. at 441 (noting that case law appears to be
in uniform agreement as to perfection of security interests in trademarks governed by UCC
(citing Joseph v. 1200 Valencia, Inc. (In re 199Z, Inc.), 137 B.R. 778, 782 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1992); In re Chattanooga Choo-Choo Co., 98 B.R. 792, 796 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989); In re
C.C. & Co., Inc., 86 B.R. 485, 486-87 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988); Roman Cleanser Co. v. Nat'l
Acceptance Co. ofAm. (In re Roman Cleanser Co.), 43 B.R. 940,946 & n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1984); Creditor's Comm. of TR-3 Indus., Inc. v. Capital Bank (In re TR-3 Industries, Inc.), 41
BR. 128,131 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984))), affdsub nom. Trimarchi v. Together Dev. Corp., 255
B.R. 606 (D. Mass. 2000).
75. See Joseph v. 1200 Valencia, Inc. (In re 199Z, Inc.), 137 B.R. 778, 782 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1992) (ruling that compliance with Article 9 of UCC, not Lanham Act under preemption
theory, perfects security interests in trademarks); Roman Cleanser Co. v. Nat'l Acceptance Co.
of Am. (In re Roman Cleanser Co.), 43 B.R. 940, 946 (Bankr. E.D. Mich 1984) (ruling that
compliance with Article 9 of UCC perfected security interests in trademark collateral; Creditor's
Comm. of TR-3 Indus., Inc. v. Capital Bank (In re TR-3 Indus., Inc.), 41 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1984) (concluding that compliance with Article 9 of UCC perfected security interest
in trademark); see also Haemmerli, supra note 57, at 1656 (noting that consensus is that state
UCC law governs security interest in trademarks).
76. See Trimarchi v. Together Dev. Corp., 255 B.R. 606, 610-11 (D. Mass. 2000)
(concluding that recording of assignments required by Lanham Act does not include security
interests). In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of America's Hobby Center, Inc.
v. Hudson United Bank (In re America's Hobby Center, Inc.), 223 B.R. 275, 286 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1998), the court explained that
[n]one of the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, nor the New York
Court of Appeals has spoken definitively on whether a security interest in a trade-
mark is perfected only upon recording it with the trademark office, or whether a
filing in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code ... is
adequate. Whereas the weight of such authority is more in line with a determina-
tion that the UCC would control, the matter is hardly free from doubt .... How-
ever, case law ... clarifies] that for federal law to supersede the UCC "the federal
statute itself must provide a method for perfecting the security interest."
Id. (citing In re 199Z, Inc., 137 B.R. at 782; In re Roman Cleanser Co., 43 B.R. at 944; In re
TR-3 Indus., 41 BR. at 131).
77. Saridakis v. United Airlines, 166 F.3d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Haem-
merli, supra note 57, at 1653-55 (discussing federal preemption problems in commercial law
context).
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encompasses a grant of a security interest.'8 Courts have resolved such doubt
by examining the ordinary usage of the term "assignment" at the time of
enactment of the federal trademark law? 9 At the time of enactment, a grant
of a "mortgage," rather than an "assignment," was the common way of de-
scribing a grant of a security interest." Further, the Lanham Act refers to the
"successor to the business.""' This reference suggests that Congress intended
an outright assignment of trademarks that are part of a business in the context
of the sale of an entire business.8 2 Moreover, Congress had expressed its
awareness of the existence of security interests in intellectual property, such
as copyrights, by including such liens in the recording requirements for the
transfer of copyrights. 3 Congress opted out of such inclusion when it passed
the Lanham Act for trademarks.
84
Additionally, courts distinguish between security interests and assign-
ments of trademarks."' An assignment of a trademark is an absolute transfer
of the entire right to use the mark along with its good will."6 The grant of a
78. In re Together Dev. Corp., 227 B.R. 439,441 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998).
79. See id. (looking to common usage of "assignment" to determine its meaning within
Lanham Act). Congress passed the Lanham Act in 1946, prior to the general adoption of the
UCC by the states. Id.
80. Id.
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1999) (stating that no application to register mark under
section 1051(b) of this title shall be assignable prior to filing of amendment under section
1051(c) of this title to bring application into conformity with section 1051(a) of this title or
filing of verified statement of use under section 1051 (a) of this title, except for assignment to
successor to business of applicant).
82. See In re Together Dev. Corp., 227 B.R. at 441 ("Two other considerations indicate
the statute does not apply to security interest filings. First, its reference to the 'successor to the
business' suggests Congress had in mind an outright assignment in the context of the sale of an
entire business of which the trademark is a part.").
83. See id. ("Congress has expressly included consensual liens in the copyright recording
system, thereby demonstrating its awareness of the possibility of such liens and its inclination
to make manifest an intention to require their recording .. ").
84. See id. (concluding that Congress did not provide for recording of security interests
in trademarks in Lanham Act).
85. See, e.g., Trimarchi v. Together Dev. Corp., 255 BR. 606, 610-11 (D. Mass. 2000)
(contrasting Lanham Act, which speaks of assignments - not security interests - to Trademarks
and Copyright Act, which specifically addresses security interests in copyrights); Joseph v. 1200
Valencia, Inc. (In re 199Z, Inc.), 137 B.R. 778,782 (Bankr. C.D. Cal 1992) ("'Trademark cases
distinguish between security interests and assignments'" (quoting Roman Cleanser Co. v. Nat'l
Acceptance Co. of Am. (In re Roman Cleanser Co.), 43 B.R. 940, 944 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1984))); In re C.C. & Co., Inc., 86 B.R. 485,486-87 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) (concurring with
judgment of other courts that distinguish between assignments and security interests in trade-
marks under Lanham Act); In re Roman Cleanser Co., 43 BR. at 944 ("[A] security interest in
a trademark is not equivalent to an assignment.").
86. See Acme Valve & Fittings Co. v. Wayne, 386 F. Supp. 1162,1165 (S.D. Tex. 1974)
("In order for a transfer of rights in a trademark to constitute a sale or assignment, thereby
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security interest in a trademark is much less than a transfer of entire rights; it
is merely an agreement to assign the trademark in the event of default by the
debtor.' Further, the Lanham Act does not provide for the filing of notifica-
tion of security interest in trademarks.s Indeed, the text of section 1060 of the
Lanham Act requires the recordation of assignments of trademarks if the
assignee does not want the assignment voided without notice as against a
subsequent purchaser."9 Accordingly, the Lanham Act does not provide a
perfection scheme for trademarks.'
Consequently, Article 9 of the UCC governs the manner of perfecting
security interests in trademarks. A financing statement indicating the trade-
mark collateral filed with the applicable state office, often the office of the
secretary of state,9 is necessary to perfect the security interests in the collat-
eral.' Thus, according to the courts, there is no justification for federal
preemption and dual filings in both a state office and the United States Patent
and Trademark Office."
vesting title to the trademark in a party, the transfer must be absolute and must relate to the
entire rights in the trademark."); Li'l' Red Barn, Inc. v. Red Barn Sys., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 98,
107 (N.D. Ind. 1970) ("[T]he rule is well established that a mere agreement for the future
assignment of a trademark is not an assignment of either the mark itself or the good will
attached to it.").
87. See In re Roman Cleanser Co., 43 B.R. at 944 (distinguishing between security
interests in trademarks and assignment of trademarks).
88. See Trimarchi, 255 B.R. at 611-12 (noting absence of any federal system for
recordation of security interests in trademarks).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1999) provides:
An assignment shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser for a valuable
consideration without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark
Office within three months after the date thereof or prior to such subsequent
purchase. A separate record of assignments submitted for recording hereunder shall
be maintained in the Patent and Trademark Office.
Id.; see Trimarchi, 255 B.R. at 610-11 (stating that section 1060 of Lanham Act requires
recording trademark assignments if assignee does not want them voided without notice or
against subsequent purchaser).
90. See In re Roman Cleanser Co., 43 B.R. at 944 ("Since a security interest in a trade-
mark is not equivalent to an assignment, the filing of a security interest is not covered by the
Lanham Act.").
91. See, e.g., In re Together Dev. Corp., 227 B.R. 439, 441 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998)
(noting that Trimarchi failed to make appropriate filing with Secretary of State of Connecticut).
92. See U.C.C. § 9-310 (2001) (filing provision); U.C.C. § 9-501 (2001) (filing office
provision).
93. See Roman Cleanser Co. v. Nat'l Acceptance Co. of Am. (In re Roman Cleanser Co.),
43 B.R. 940, 945-46 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) (reviewing commentator's analysis of federal
preemption of perfection of security interests in trademarks and concluding that "there is no
justification for holding that Code-perfected security interests are not valid").
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 37 (2002)
For example, in Trimarchi v. Together Development Corp.,94 the debtor
granted a security interest in its trademark to a creditor.9 The creditor filed
a financing statement with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, not
with the Secretary of State for the state of Connecticut, the location of the
debtor's principal place of business.' The debtor later filed a voluntary peti-
tion for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code.' The bankruptcy court ordered the debtor to sell substantially all of its
assets, including its trademarks." The creditor objected to the sale of the
trademark, claiming a security interest.9" The bankruptcy court ruled that the
creditor failed to perfect its security interest in the trademark and, thus, was
not entitled to any lien on the proceeds of the sale of the debtor's assets."°
The creditor appealed the bankruptcy court's decision to the district court.
The creditor argued that as with copyrights, trademarks are intangible
and lack an identifiable situs.0' Thus, the efficiency of a single recordation
scheme for trademarks compels federal preemption under the Lanham Act." 2
Consequently, security interests in trademarks occur upon the appropriate
filing with the United States Patent and Trademark Office."0 3 The district
court rejected this argument upon a careful analysis of Article 9 of the UCC,
the Lanham Act, case law, and general policy considerations."
The Trimarchi court observed that federal preemption of the UCC
perfection schemes will occur only when relevant federal statutes "specifically
and systematically provide for the filing of all security interests in a given
form of property."' The court noted that "[a] federal intellectual property
registration or certificate of title, such as a certificate of federal trademark
registration, reveals the name of the registrant and identifies the property but
does not provide a list of lienholders."' Thus, the court explained that:
94. 255 B.R. 606 (D. Mass. 2000).






101. See id. at 609 (discussing creditor's argument analogizing intangible nature of copy-
rights with trademarks in support of preemption theory).
102. See id. (discussing creditor's argument that as with copyrights, intangible nature of
trademarks and efficiency of single recordation system compels preemption treatment for trade-
marks in manner similar to copyrights).
103. See id. (noting creditor's contention that as with copyrights, federal trademark assign-
ment registration preempts any state requirements).
104. See id. at 610-12 (analyzing whether LanhamAct preempts UCC's filing requirements).
105. Id. at 612 (internal quotations omitted).
106. Id.
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national registration alone, without any federal system for the recordation
of security interests, ... would leave the holder of a security interest with
no means of recording or perfecting that interest. Absent a reliable means
of verifying the status of their collateral, secured lenders would be more
reluctant to extend credit. Such a result would be inconsistent with the
stated purpose of Article 9 of providing a "simple and unified structure"
for secured transactions. !17
The court ruled that the Lanham Act does not preempt the UCC's filing
requirements and that the perfection of a security interest in a trademark is
governed by Article 9 of the UCC.'" Moreover, the court also noted that "in
1988 the Senate passed a bill that, among other things, would have created a
federal filing of security interests in trademarks and brought both the
recordation of and the priority of security interests in trademarks into confor-
mity with the counterpart copyright provisions."'" However, the portion of
the bill related to security interests did not pass the House, thereby leaving the
UCC to govern security interests in trademarks."'
The Trimarchi decision is consistent with precedents in this area."' In
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of America's Hobby Center v.
Hudson United Bank (In re America's Hobby Center), 1 2 the plaintiff sought
a declaratory judgment that the defendant bank did not have a perfected
security interest in the debtor's "Megatech" trademark." 3 Before the suit, the
defendant bank's had security interests in all of the debtor's present and future
trademarks. 4 At the beginning of its analysis, the court noted that Congress,
the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and the New York Court of Appeals
have not addressed definitively how a security interest in a trademark is
107. Id.
108. Id. at611-12.
109. Id. at 611.
110. Id.; see Stuart M. Rilback, Intellectual Property Licenses, The Impact of Bankruptcy,
in UNDERSTANDING THE INTEucTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE 185, 211 n.97 (PLI Intellectual
Property Course Handbook Series No. 0-620, 2000) (discussing history of bill and effect of
House's failure to pass it).
111. See, e.g., Roman Cleanser Co. v. Nat'l Acceptance Co. of Am. (In re Roman Cleanser
Co.), 43 B.R. 940, 945-46 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) (refusing to use Lanham Act to preempt
state UCC law with respect to security interests in trademarks); Creditor's Comm. of TR-3
Indus., Inc. v. Capital Bank (In re TR-3 Indus., Inc.), 41 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984)
(finding that "[it was not the purpose or intent of Congress in enacting the Lanham Act to
provide a method for the perfection of security interests in trademarks, tradenames or applica-
tions for the registration of the same").
112. 223 B.R. 275 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998).
113. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors ofAm.'s Hobby. Ctr. v. Hudson United Bank
(In re Am.'s Hobby Ctr.), 223 B.R. 275, 286 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998).
114. Id.
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perfected.1 ' Nevertheless, the court concluded that case law and the then
proposed UCC revision clarified that "for federal law to supersede the UCC
the federal statute itself must provide a method for perfecting the security
interest.""1 6 Based on this conclusion, the court found enough disagreement
in the law to warrant further litigation, denying defendant bank's motion to
dismiss." 7
Similarly, in Roman Cleanser Co. v. NationalAcceptance Co. ofAmerica
(In re Roman Cleanser Co.),"" the court compared the filing provisions under
the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act and concluded that unlike the Copy-
right Act, the Lanham Act does not cover security interests in trademarks.' 9
The court reasoned that if Congress intended that security interests in trade-
marks be perfected by filing with the United States Trademark Office, it could
have expressly provided for such a filing, as it did in the Copyright Act. 2'
The court ruled that the Lanham Act only covered assignments of trademarks
and not security interests.'' Accordingly, a security interest in a trademark
is governed by Article 9 of the UCC.1'
In summary, although the Lanham Act governs federal trademarks, there
is no federal preemption of the perfection of security interests in trademarks.
State regulations, through the adoption of Article 9 of the UCC, control the
perfection of security interests in trademarks. In recent years, the growth of
e-commerce has given rise to explosive growth of domain names. Domain
names have been compared to trademarks because domain names are com-
prised of words and attain value dependent on their attending use." 3 The next
part of this Article examines whether such a comparison is correct and
115. Id.
116. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
117. Id. at 287.
118. 93 B.R. 940 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984).
119. See Roman Cleanser Co. v. Nat'l Acceptance Co. of Am. (In re Roman Cleanser Co.)
43 B.R. 940, 946 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) (noting that UCC commentary did not recognize
Lanham Act filing provisions as equivalent to filing provisions of Article 9 of UCC).
120. See id. at 946 ("If Congress intended to provide a means for recording security
interests in trademarks... it would have been simple so to state.").
121. Id. at 944.
122. Id.
123. Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560 n.9 (E.D. Va. 1999) (observing that domain
names are addresses and derive their value primarily from their use). The more that Intemet
users visit a web site by using its domain name, the higher the value of the domain name. See
id. at 561 (arguing that domain name registration entails only contract rights and that its value
derives solely from how registrant exploits it). In this context, a domain name is more analo-
gous to a trademark and its attached goodwill than a patent whose value is independent from
its content or the owner's goodwill. See id. at 560 n.9 (discussing how domain names are more
similar to trademarks than patents).
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whether the existing perfection scheme of security interests in trademarks
should be the same for domain names.
IV Domain Names as General Intangibles
A. Domain Names as the New Valuable Corporate Assets
In recent years companies rushed to the Internet to establish their pres-
ence,24 utilizing the worldwide network of computers to sell products and
services through various business models, ranging from customer to customer
(C2C), business to customer (B2C), and business to business (B2B) models. 2
To stand out from the crowded dot-corn world, e-companies attempt to quickly
brand themselves on the Internet. 26 Through branding, e-companies seek to
get Interet users - their potential customers - to visit and revisit their sites. 27
124. See Robert H. Zakon, Hobbes'Internet Timeline v5.4, at http'//www.zakon.org/robert/
internet/timeline (last modified Aug. 23, 2001) (tracing development of Internet from 1950s
through present). In January 1996, there were only 100,000 web sites on the World Wide Web.
Less than five years later, as of September 2000, there are 21,166,912 web sites on the World
Wide Web. Id.
125. See EcoN. &STATISTICSADMIN., U.S. DEP'TOF COMMERCE, DIGrrALECONOMY2000
(2000), at httph/www.esa.gov/de2000.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2001) (providing comprehensive
analysis of various C2C, B2C, and B2B business models); GOLDMAN SACHS, B2B: 2B OR NOT
2B? (Nov. 12, 1999), available at httpJ/www.gs.com/hightech/research/b2b (last visited Oct.
24, 2001) (providing comprehensive analysis of business to business e-commerce); see also
Suein Hwang & Mylene Mangalindan, Yahoo's Grand Vision for Web Advertising Takes Some
Hard Hits, WAL ST. J., Sept. 1,2000, at Al (facing concern about failed promise of Web-based
advertising Yahoo's new Corporate Yahoo platform aims at moving Yahoo into business-to-
business market by integrating Yahoo's portal into companies' internal Web networks); Don
Tapscot, Virtual Webs Will Revolutionize Business, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2000, at A38 ("B2B
exchanges pave the way for the new model... company in the digital economy... vertically
integrated ... corporation[s are] giving way to a form of wealth creation called the business web.
[It] is a distinct system of suppliers, distributors, commerce services providers, infrastructure
providers and customers that use the Internet.").
126. See Nguyen, supra note 6, at 952-58 (discussing "branding" in e-commerce).
127. See Andrew J. Frackman & Robert M. Stem, Federal Circuit Ruling, Largely Ig-
nored, ImpactsPatentInfringementEquation: EffectPredictedParticularfor BusinessMethod
Litigation, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 17, 2000, at S7 (noting that "the key to success on the Internet turns
on branding and the first-mover advantage"), James F. Haggerty, Marketing Your Firm: Toward
Common Sense Branding Strategies, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 14, 2000, at 5 (observing that "[t]he rise
of the Internet and other technologies, in fact, is where this focus on 'branding' all began");
Rachel King, What's Wireless.com Worth? Maybe $15M, 2000 WL 4064606, 1/31/00 Interac-
tive Wk. From ZDWire (reporting that many dot.com companies spend $100 million in brand
campaigns); Che Odom, MIAm DAILY Bus. REV., June 27, 2000, at A], LEXIS American
Lawyer Media File (reporting that use of such names as Compaqvirtualbank.com, EMC-
virtualbank.com, and Textronvirtualbank.com will enable VirtualBank and its business partners
Compaq, EMC Corp., and Textron Financial Corp. to appeal to worker loyalty, allowing this
new banking arrangement to serve as "a useful inducement to attract and retain talent" at those
participating companies); Joe Starkey (N.Y. Times), Brand-Building More Important to Web
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Their business model was to grow quickly at first and to earn profits later.
28
A way to achieve such dreams overnight is to own a generic domain
name that is memorable and accessible by everyone. 129 The "right" domain
name for Internet branding purposes is a single word with very few characters
that describes the products or services offered at the web site.30 Internet
consumers who want a particular product, but who do not know which
websites they should visit, will most likely search for the appropriate website
by keying the common name of the product (such as wine or computers).'
Sites Online Companies Scramble to Stand Out From Crowd, reprinted in MINNEAPOLIS-ST.
PAUL STAR TRiB., Jan. 24, 2000, at 5D ("In the famous cocktail-party scene in 1967's landmark
film 'The Graduate,' a helpful older man whispers a single word of business advice to callow,
befuddled young Benjamin, played by Dustin Hoffman: 'Plastics.' Remake the movie today
and you'd have to change the line to 'Branding.'").
128. See Dickerson, supra note 18, at 299 (observing that "cybercompanies seem to be
highly valued because of investor's view of their projected growth, not because of current
profits"); Jim Kerstetter, Finding the Right Formula: Making Money on the Net Is Trickier
Than Anyone Suspected, Bus. WY., Oct. 23, 2000, at 44 (reporting that difficulties of dot-coin
companies have lead to questions about viability of their business models); Scott McNealy, It's
Like... Businesses Built on Metaphors Still Need Value, FORBEs ASAP, Oct. 2, 2000, at 47
("Startups may put rapid growth ahead of profits for a time, but eventually they will have to
return to the true nature of business. They will have to charge more than the cost of the goods
and services they deliver, and make a profit."); see also Madlyn Gleich Primoff & Erica G.
Weinberger, E-Commerce and Dot-Con Bankruptcies: Assumption, Assignment and Rejection
of Executory Contracts, IncludingIntellectual PropertyAgreements, and Related Issues Under
Sections 365(c), 36 5 (e), and 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 307,
307 (2000) (reporting that during 2000 "scores of dot-corn companies have been sold . . ., shut
down or have filed for protection under title 11").
129. See Lee. J. Plave, ACPA Gives Franchisors New Weap6n in War Against Cyber-
squatting, FRANCHISING Bus. & L. ALERT, Jan. 2000; at 1 (recognizing domain names have
become important part of branding and commercial identification); Nick Wingfield, The Game
of the Name: Thinking Up the PerfectAddress Crucial; Just Hope Nobody Else Owns It, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 22, 1999, at R14 (reporting that budding Interet entrepreneurs who search for right
name for their new companies encounter "nightmare" process because most memorable dot-com
addresses are no longer available and selecting difficult to remember company name presents
problem of users forgetting name).
130. See Jonathan Lambeth, the telegraph.com: Domainia as net names go for millions,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 8,2001, available at 2000 WL 21888662 (reporting that offer of 4.4
million pounds for inactive web site e-buy.com for "an international department store," has been
turned down by its owner and that BrainwareMedia paid $8 million for mp3audiobooks.com
to Boston resident); Thomas E. Weber, Register.Com Aims to Market Internet Addresses to
Everyone, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1999, at B7 ("Domain names have evolved into one of the
Internet's most important commodities - and an increasingly scarce resource. Though the
universe of online addresses is theoretically unlimited, the best addresses get snapped up quick-
ly. A latecomer might find himself stuck with an unwieldy address like 'joespizzaofbrooklyn.
corn' instead of the easier to type, and remember, 'joes.com."').
131. See Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("[Tlhere is a lucrative
market for certain generic or clever domain names... [that are] extremely valuable to Internet
entrepreneurs .... A domain name with significant value on the open market certainly would
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To reach these consumers, Internet companies purchase generic domain names,
such as wine.com or computers.com, at high prices."'
The overnight branding dream has created a secondary market for domain
names.'33 Because most, if not all, generic and memorable domain names are
no longer available through accredited registrars such as Network Solutions,
Inc. (NSI), Internet companies can obtainthese desired corporate assets through
the secondary market at high prices. 34 In the secondary market, domain names
are speculative commodities.'35
B. Domain Names Valuation
The secondary market for domain names is a flourishing industry that has
enticed established e-companies such as NSI'36 and Register.com' 3' to enter
be an attractive... target for a judgment creditor .... ."). The Dorer court also noted that the
plaintiffs do not claim that their domain has any open market value as would the domain name
"computers.com." Id. at 561 n.14; see Johnson, supra note 1 (reporting that new owner of
business.corn paid $7.5 million for domain name because he believes that "[w]ith business.com,
85% of the brand-building is already done"); see also Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W.
Court Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that Internet users who do
not know domain name of site for which they are looking have two options: trying to guess
proper domain name or seeking assistance of Internet search engine); Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp.2d 1070, 1074-76 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (denying
plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction upon finding that use of generic terms "playboy"
and "playmate" as key words or search terms does not amount to trademark infringement or
dilution), aff'd, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999).
132. See Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (noting that certain domain names may be "ex-
tremely valuable to Internet entrepreneurs"); see also SUBMERGEDideas.com, Top Domain
Sellers, at httpJv/www.submerged-ideas.com/valuation/topdomainsales.htm (current as of June
30, 2001) (reporting that wine.com sold at between $3.3 and $3.9 million).
133. See Wendy R. Leibowitz, Going Once, Going Twice-Sold! Domain Name Market
Heats Up, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 28, 1998, at B6 (reporting on domain name sales in secondary
market); BofA Was Winning Bidder of Loans.com Web Domain, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2000, at
BI5 (reporting that Bank of America Corp. bought Loan.com for $3 million at auction sale held
by OreatDomains.com).
134. See Leibowitz, supra note 133, at B6 (reporting on domain name brokerage business
on Internet); Wingfield, supra note 5 (reporting on demand for and scarcity of memorable
domain names, and on domain name speculators who register domain names hoping to sell them
at substantial markups).
135. See Karen Kaplan, Domain Name Trade Gives Rise to Whole New Breed of Brokers
Internet: They're Betting That the Buying and Selling of Web Addresses Will Be Big Business
for a Long Time to Come, LA. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999, at CI (reporting on secondary market for
domain names); see also David Adlerstein, Name of the Game, S. FLA. Bus. J., Mar. 24, 2000,
at 49A (reporting start-up companies are cashing in on domain name aflermarket).
136. See Leslie Walker, The Name of the Game Is Names, WASH. POST, June 22,2000, at
El (reporting that Network Solutions plans to enter "online market where people will be able
to buy, sell and appraise previously owned domain names").
137. See Clint Boulton, Register.com Dips into Domain Reselling Well, intemetnews.com,
Sept. 15, 2000, at http://www.internetnews.com/bus-new/arficle/0,3_461201,00.html (report-
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the market."' 8 Even well-established brick and mortar companies such as
Proctor and Gamble are in the speculation market for domain names.139 The
secondary market for domain names often has been compared to real estate
speculation. 40 Many web sites in this industry offer a broad range of services,
including sales, purchase, and valuation of domain names. 4' Auctioning is
the common sale method employed by these web sites. 42
Many domain name brokerage web sites offer various valuation models
to estimate the value of domain names.'43 Most of these web sites provide
crude and simple valuation models for potential domain name buyers and
sellers to employ.'" For example, GreatDomains, one of the two pioneer
companies in this industry, employs a valuation model called the "four C's.'0
45
These four C's are Characters, Commerce, .Com, and Comparables. 146 Each
ing that Register.com bought Aflernic.com, pioneer in domain resales, for $49.4 million in stock
and cash).
138. Besides Network Solutions Inc. and Register.com, there are a number of companies
operating in the domain name resale business. These Internet companies include httpj/www.
greatdomains.com, httpJ/www.domainiq.com, and http://www.domainart.com (last visited Oct.
24,2001).
139. See Cynthia Flash,Are They Cybersquatters or Cyberentrepreneurs?, CMP TEcHWEB
NEws, July 20,2000, available at http://content.techweb.com/wire/storyTWB20000720SO006
(reporting that Proctor and Gamble is among large corporations selling at high prices generic
domain names that they had registered); Patrick Larkin, Profit.com: P & G Sells 'Net names,
CIN. POST, Aug.30, 2000, at 6B (reporting that Procter and Gamble is selling almost 100 generic
domain names, registered in 1995, through auction website OreatDomains.com).
140. See Wingfield, supra note 5 (reporting that according to GreatDomains.com, online
domain brokerage has more promise than traditional real estate brokerage); see also Press Re-
lease, BuyDomains.com, Are All the Great Domain Names Taken? The Rise of the Secondary
Market (Mar. 6, 2000), available at http:/www.buydomains.com/pr0306.html ("Internet do-
main names are the real estate equivalent to location, and with millions of high visibility names
taken, the secondary market, where resellers reign, is where the action is." (quoting Mike Mann,
CEO of BuyDomains.com)).
141. See, e.g., http'J/www.greatdomains.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2001) (listing services
offered); http://www.buydomains.com (last visited Oct. 24,2001) (same); http://www.domains.
com (last visited Oct. 24, 2001) (same); http//www.domainsauction.com (last visited Oct. 24,
2001) (same).
142. See, e.g., http://www.greatdomains.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2001) (noting use of
auctions); http://www.domainsacutions.com (last visited Oct. 24,2001) (same).
143. See, e.g., http://www.greatdomains.com (last visited Oct. 24,2001) (showing models
to estimate value of domain names); http./www.domainiq.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2001)
(same); http://www.domainmartcom (last visited Oct 24,2001) (same).
144. See, e.g., http://www.greatdomains.com (last visited Oct. 24,2001) (noting valuation
models available); http/www.domainiq.om (last visited Oct. 24, 2001) (same); http://www.
domainmart.com (last visited Oct. 24,2001) (same).
145. See http://www.greitdomains.com/support/AppraislAbout.htm (last visited Oct. 24,
2001) (describing "4C valuation model").
146. Id.
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domain name is rated on the first three criteria from a scale of zero to four
stars. 47 Higher star ratings indicate more valuable domain names.' 4 Great
Domains.com then compares this preliminary rating to those of previously
purchased domain names to determine the final value. 149 This last step repre-
sents the fourth criteria of the valuation model."
Regarding the Characters criteria, short domain names generate higher
ratings than long domain names because the former are generally easier to
remember and to spell and have more impact.' A domain name with fewer
than five characters receives four stars, while one over twenty characters long
is substantially less valuable." 2 The sliding scale of the rating system gives
a domain name with six to ten characters three stars, one with eleven to fifteen
characters two stars, one with sixteen to twenty characters one star, and one
beyond twenty characters no stars.
15 3
Domain names having the potential to attract traffic to websites and
thereby generate revenue are highly valued under the Commerce criteria.
54
In other words, these domain names are highly marketable.15 Like most
brand names, domain names that are "based on well-known phrases, or are
closely associated with a business opportunity with a sizable market share,
enjoy a favorable position.""5 6
Domain names registered in the .Com top-level domain earn a four-star
rating. '5 GreatDomains.com bases this criteria on the belief that .Com con-
veys a sense of exclusivity equivalent to residing in New York, Paris, or Sing-
apore. 5 Thus, owning a domain name in the top-level domain .Com is an
instant branding that generates premium ratings.'59
Finally, the Comparables criteria involves a comparison of the domain
name at issue to previously purchased names." This comparison ensures an
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claims to have one of the largest databases of sales and appraisal data as a
result of using this method.162
Recently, GreatDomains.com sold Loans.com to Bank of America for $3
million.'63 That sale is among the highest prices ever paid for a domain
name." Other high profile domain name acquisitions include Business.com
for $7.5 million and Wine.com for $3.5 million.'65 At least one expert in the
domain name resale industry believes that "it's a sign the domain business is
maturing that its assets - the names - are being resold to those who have the
highest-value use for them."'66 Furthermore, that same expert does not expect
the million-dollar name sales to vanish after the dot-com fever has subsided
because domain names identify companies on the Internet, and valuable
domain names may significantly reduce advertising costs. 67
The commercialization of domain names in the open market is a current
phenomenon, unexpected before the arrival of e-commerce on the World
Wide Web. The fact that individuals are treating domain names as commodi-
ties begs the question of whether domain names are or should be property in
the eyes of the law.
C. Domain Names and Property Interests
1. Domain Name Formation
Deciding whether domain names are a form of intangible property for
purposes of secured transactions requires an examination of domain name
formation. A domain name registration is a creature of a service contract
between a domain name registrar (such as NSI) and a domain name regis-
trant." ' Until recently, NSI held the exclusive right to assign domain names
162. Id.
163. See BofA Was WinningBidder ofLoans.com Web Domain, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8,2000,
at B15 (reporting that Bank of America Corp. bought Loans.com for $3 million at auction sale
held by GreatDomains.com).
164. See Bank ofAmerica Buys Loans.com for $3 Million at GreatDomains. com in the
Highest Price Ever Paid for a Domain Name at Auction, BUS. W)RE, Feb. 8,2000, Westnews,
BWIREPLUS (noting that Loans.cor sale was highest ever at auction as of Jan.28, 2000); TOP
Domain Sales, at http://www.submerged-ideas.com/valuation/topsales.htm (current as of June
30, 2001) (listing high profile domain name sales).
165. See Johnson, supra note 1, at Al (reporting that eCompanies paid $7.5 million in
stock and cash to Texas entrepreneur for Business.com domain name); Janis Mara & Erick
Oruenwedel, Name that Domain, MEDIAWEEK, Mar. 27, 2000, at 1Q10, available at 2000 WL
14721382 (reporting that VirtualVineyard.com bought Wine.corn for $3.3 million).
166. See Walker, supra note 136, at El (interviewing Jim Rutt, chief executive officer of
Network Solutions).
167. Id.
168. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86 (Va. 2000) (quoting
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in the top-level domains such as .com, .gov, .org, .net, and .edu.169 Currently,
an initial two-year domain name registration with NSI costs $35 per year and
is renewable in perpetuity thereafter for successive one-year terms."
NSI assigns domain names on a first-come, first-serve basis by comparing
new applications with a database of existing domain names to prevent duplica-
tion of previously registered names.'71 NSI then matches each domain name
Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999)); see VeriSign Service Agreement, at
httpJ/www.netsol.com/enUS/legal/service-agreement.jhtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2001) (giving
service contract for NSI customers); see also Brookflield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast
Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining NSI's role in domain name
system); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 953 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (same).
169. See Lockheed Martin Corp., 985 F. Supp. at 953 ("Under a contract with the National
Science Foundation, NSI manages domain name registrations for the '.com,' '.net,' '.org,'
'.edu,' and '.gov' top-level domains."); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace:
UsinglCANNtoRouteAround theAPA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17,57 (2000) ("The
NSF-NSI [National Science Foundation-Network Solutions, Inc.] 'Cooperative Agreement'
gave NSI a monopoly over .com registrations that it would ultimately build into a multi-billion
dollar business; the monopoly originally was scheduled to expire in September 1998."). NSI
is no longer the exclusive registrar. More than fifty domain name registrars exist for the .com,
.net, and .org top-level domains. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238,
238, 242 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that 'Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI") formerly enjoyed
a monopoly as the only domain name registrar"). "NSI still operates and maintains the top-level
domain name servers and zone files which enable the other registrars to access the DNS
[Internal Domain Name System] and to transmit domain name registration information for the
.com, .net, and .org top level domain names to the [Internet Domain Name] System." Id.
170. See VeriSign Service Agreement, 4, at http://www.netsol.com/enUS/legal/service-
agreement.jhtml (Oast visited Oct. 18, 2001) (listing contract provisions of service agreement).
The agreement states:
As consideration for the services you have selected, you agree to pay Network
Solutions the applicable service(s) fees set forth on our Web site at the time of your
selection [currently $35 dollars per year]. All fees are due immediately and are non-
refundable .... Unless otherwise specified, each Network Solutions' service is for
a two-year initial term and renewable in perpetuity thereafter for successive one-year
terms. Any renewal of your services with us is subject to our then current terms and
conditions and payment of all applicable service fees at the time of renewal.
Id.
171. See Brookflield Communications, Inc., 174 F.3d at 1044 (describing role of NSI in
domain name registration process). The court noted:
To obtain a domain name, an individual or entity files an application with Network
Solutions listing the domain name the applicant wants. Because each web page
must have an ... unique domain name, Network Solutions checks to see whether
the requested domain name has already been assigned to someone else. If so, the
applicant must choose a different domain name. Other than requiring an applicant
to make certain representations, Network Solutions does not make an independent
determination about a registrant's right to use a particular domain name.
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to the corresponding Internet Protocol (IP) number for the desired Internet
site.172 The company performs such services pursuant to a domain name
service agreement whereby registrants must make certain representations
about their rights to use their domain names and the fact that this use does not
interfere with the rights of another party." Furthermore, registrants must
agree to be bound by NSI's "Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy" as approved by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) on October 24, 1999.14
2. Domain Names: Contractual Rights or Intangible Property?
Domain names arguably entail contractual rather than property rights
because they are the product of service agreements between domain name
registrars and registrants. 75 This contracted-for service is similar to "owning"
telephone numbers."" It has the potential for commercial exploits that may
Id.; see Lockheed Martin Corp., 985 F. Supp. at 953 (noting that users may choose any avail-
able second-level domain name).
172. See Lockheed Martin Corp., 985 F. Supp. at 953 listing functions ofNSI). The court
stated:
NSI performs two function in the domain name system. First, it screens domain
name applications against its registry to prevent repeated registrations of the same
name. Second, it maintains a directory linking domain names with the IP numbers
of domain name servers. The domain name servers, which are outside of NSI's
control, connect domain names with Internet resources such as Web sites and e-
mail systems.
Id.
173. VeriSign Service Agreement, 17, at http://www.netsol.com/enUS/legal/service-
agreement.jhtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2001).
174. Id. at 8; see VeriSign Dispute Policy, at httpJ/www.netsol.com/enUS/legal/dispute-
policy.jhtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2001) (detailing dispute agreement and ICANN approval).
175. Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999).
176. Id.; see Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998) (comparing
domain names to vanity telephone numbers based on trademarks, such as 1-800-HOLIDAY for
Holiday Inns); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 957-58
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (analogizing function of domain names and telephone numbers). But see
Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 584-85 (2d Cir. 2000) (warning
against adopting analogy between domain names and telephone number mnemonics because
"the nature of domain names is not susceptible to such a uniform, monolithic characterization").
The court continued:
As the Supreme Court has stated in an analogous and related context, "aware as we
are of the changes taking place in the law, the technology, and the industrial
structure related to telecommunications, . . . we believe it is unwise and unneces-
sary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific set of words now."
Id. (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 742
(1996) (Breyer, J., plurality opinion)).
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generate significant return for the registrant.'" However, the value of the
domain name often depends on how the registrant uses it.' Consequently,
a domain name without value or goodwill added by the user is usually not
valuable.
179
The electronic medium of the Internet and the recent growth of e-com-
merce, however, have challenged the notion that domain name value is
dependent on use. Many people now consider domain names to be valuable
assets irrespective of any goodwill attached to them.8 0 Parties are trading
these names in the open market at high prices unrelated to their content or
goodwill.'" These domain names are often generic words because the market
rewards genericness with higher prices. I"
The classification of domain names as either property or contracts is an
issue of first impression with which courts have struggled.'8 3 However, the
few courts that have faced the issue did not focus on classification but rather
on how registrants form and use domain names. 4 For example, in Umbro
177. See Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (recognizing "I-800-COLLECT" and "1-800-
FLOWERS" as two extremely valuable commercial tools); Lockheed Martin Corp., 985 F.
Supp. at 958 ("Domain names, like telephone numbers, are also valuable to trademark holders
when they make it easier for customers to find the trademark holder.").
178. See Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 561 ("In most cases, a domain name registration is value-
less apart from the way it is used by the entity with rights to it .....
179. Id. at 560 n.9, 561.
180. Id. at 561; see supra Parts IV.A and IV.B (discussing domain names as corporate
assets and domain name valuation).
181. See Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("Indeed, there is a
lucrative market for certain generic or clever domain names that do not violate a trademark or
other right of interest but are otherwise extremely valuable to Internet entrepreneurs."); see also
supra Part IV.B and accompanying notes (discussing domain names in secondary market).
182. See David Streitfeld, $$.com; On the Web, Simplest Names Can Become Priciest
Addresses, WAsH. POST, July 15, 1999, at Al (noting that "root names" provide credibility).
183. See Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1173-74 & n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(refusing to extend tort of conversion to domain names via exception for intangible property
represented by documents, but distinguishing Lockheed and Umbro); Network Solutions, Inc.
v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86 (Va. 2000) (finding that domain names are service
contracts and thus not subject to garnishment); see also Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d
1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998) (arbitraging domain names is "commercial use" resulting in
trademark infringement); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949,
958-59 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding that domain name registrars do not commit trademark dilution,
unfair competition, or trademark infringement in providing their usual services).
184. See Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 561-62 (avoiding "knotty issue" of characterization by
forcing plaintiff to attempt to use registrar's dispute resolution procedure before issuing writ of
fieri facias); Network Solutions, Inc., 529 S.E.2d at 86 (claiming that, irrespective of classifica-
tion, contractual rights do not exist apart from registrar's services, and service ,contract not
subject to garnishment).
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International, Inc. v. 3263851 Canada, Inc.,"' a Virginia circuit court held
that a domain name registration is personal property and, thus, subject to
judgment liens and garnishment proceedings.8 6 The judgment creditor in that
case, Umbro International, sought to garnish domain names registered by the
judgment debtor, 3263851 Canada, with the garnishee, NSI. s7 NSI opposed
the garnishment by arguing inter alia that a judgment lien cannot extend to
domain names because the rights set forth in domain name registration agree-
ments depend on unperformed conditions, such as the registrar's rights to
indemnification and the registrant's continuing obligation to maintain an
accurate registration record. 88 The court rejected this argument because NSI
essentially agreed to garnishment under its dispute policy. 9 Furthermore, the
conditions would serve merely to discount the value of the domain names at
a sheriff's auction.Y
The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that regardless of
how one classifies domain names, they are not gamishable because the right
to their use is inextricably bound to the services NSI provides. 9 ' Essen-
tially, the judgment debtor's rights over its domain names do not exist
independently of NSI's services that make the names operational Internet
addresses.' 92 More broadly, the court was concerned that allowing the gar-
nishment of NSI's domain name services would open the door to garnishment
185. 48 Va. Cir. 139 (1999).
186. Umbro Int'l, Inc. v. 3263851 Canada, Inc., 48 Va. Cir. 139, 141-42 (1999), rev'dsub
noma., Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E. 2d 80 (Va. 2000). The circuit
court rejected the garnishee-registrar's arguments that the judgment debtor-registrant did not
have a possessory interest in the domain names sufficient to support a writ of fieri facias (a lien
on the judgment debtor's intangible property) because (1) the contractual rights of the registra-
tion agreement depended on unperformed conditions, (2) the lien would force the registrar to
perform services for parties with whom it would prefer not to deal, (3) domain names lack a
readily ascertainable value, and (4) this form of intellectual property results from a service
provided by the registrar and is, therefore, not subject to garnishment. Id. at 143-44. The court
rejected the fourth argument by analogizing domain names to patents, stating: "the fact that this
form of intellectual property results from a service that NSI [the garnishee] provides does not
(as NSI argues) preclude the property from garnishment any more than the service provided by
the Patent Office in issuing a patent immunizes patents from garnishment." Id. at 144 (citations
omitted). However, other courts have criticized this analogy. See Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 560
n.9 (reasoning that patents, unlike domain names, have intrinsic value regardless of use, and
even patents may not be subject to judgment liens under Virginia law).
187. Umbro, 48 Va. Cir. at 139.
188. Id. at 143.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86, 88 (Va. 2000).
192. Id. at 86.
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of any service. 93 Thus, the court concluded that "a domain name registration
is the product of a contract for services between the registrar and registrant"
and, therefore, is not a liability under the Virginia garnishment statutes.194
While relying on the above quotation from Dorer v. Arel,195 the Umbro
court apparently did not grasp the subtlety of the court's reasoning in that
case.'96 InDorer, the plaintiff sought a writ of fieri facias (or judgment lien) to
acquire the defendant's domain name in satisfaction of a trademark infiinge-
mentjudgment.'" The court admitted that whether domain names are personal
property subject to judgment liens is a "knotty issue" because domain names
that are not trademarks arguably entail only contractual rights. 98 According to
the Dorer court, in most instances, a domain name is valueless apart from its
method of use by the entity that has rights to it)99 Consequently, "if the only
value that comes from transfer of the domain name is from the value added by
the user, it is inappropriate to consider that an element subject to execution. "20
However, the court also recognized that some domain names are very valuable
assets irrespective of any goodwill that might be attached to them.2' Because
all domain names are freely assignable apart from their content, those that are
generic or clever often trade for high prices on the open market.2° Such domain
names could be attractive targets for judgment creditors. 3 Because the plain-
tiff in Dorer did not claim that the domain name at issue had any value on the
open market, however, the court's observation was moot.24 Furthermore, the
Dorer court decided not to resolve the issue of whether a domain name is
personal property subject to ajudgment lien, believing instead thatthe self-help
measures pursuant to NSI's Domain Name Dispute Policy were more effective
and less problematic for the plaintiff than seeking to compel the defendant to
transfer the domain name in satisfaction of the judgment.20 5 Thus, the court
deferred the writ pending plaintiff s recourse to the self-help method.
2°6
193. Id. at 86-87.
194. Id. (quoting Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999)).
195. 60 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D. Va. 1999).
196. Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 558-61 (E.D. Va. 1999).
197. Id. at 558-59.
198. Id. at 561.
199. Id.




204. Id. at 561 n.14.
205. Id. at 561-62.
206. Id.
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The Umbro court also ignored the fact that NSI's domain name registra-
tion agreement provides registrants with contractual rights to the exclusive use
of their names, amounting to a current possessory interest in their use." As
observed by the two dissenting justices in Umbro, these contractual rights are
not conditional, uncertain, or akin to personal services because both parties
already have fulfilled their obligations.2" For example, in this case, the judg-
ment debtor submitted its registration forms, made certain representations, and
paid the registration fees. °" NSI completed the registration of the judgment
debtor's domain names under NSI's first-come, first-served policy, thus giving
the judgment debtor the right to the exclusive use of the domain name for an
initial period of two years." 0 The dissenters concluded:
Because NSI has received everything required to give the judgment debtor
the exclusive right to use the domain names it registered, the contractual
right, a valuable asset, is the intangible personal property in which the
judgment debtor has a possessory interest.... ITihis right exists separate
and apart fromNSI'svarious services that make domain names operational
Internet addresses. These services... are mere conditions subsequent that
do not affect the garnishment analysis.
Like the Dorer court, however, the Umbro court explicitly noted that its
holding did not depend on a proper classification of domain names. 1 The
court was concerned more with garnishment of domain names than with the
question of whether domain names actually are intangible property. 3 The
court observed that there are "certain types of intangible, intellectual property
that have not been subject to levy and sale under execution."2 4 The court
noted that patents, copyrights, and trademarks historically cannot be subject to
seizure or sale by means of an execution.21 ' The court stopped its observation
207. Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80,89 (Va. 2000) (Compton,
S.J., dissenting); see also VeriSign Service Agreement, at http'/www.netsol.com/enUS/legal/
service-agreement.jhtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2001) (detailing agreement).
208. Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 89 (Compton, S.J., dissenting).
209. Id.
210. Id. The registration process with NSI only takes a few minutes to complete. To
register a domain name with NSI, see http://www.netsol.com/enUS/ (last visited Oct. 18,
2001).
211. See Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 89 (Compton, S.J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 86.
213. See id. at 85 (reviewing Virginia garnishment procedures).
214. Id. at 86 n.13.
215. Id. The court observed:
Historically, certain types of intangible, intellectual property have not been subject
to levy and sale under execution. See Ager v. Murray, 105 U.S. 126,131,26 L. Ed.
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there. If the Umbro court furthered its analysis, it would have noted that al-
though patents, copyrights, and trademarks are not subject to levy and sale
under execution, they still are classified as intangible property that can be used
as collateral to secure payment or obligation in commercial financing. Conse-
quently, domain names - like patents, copyrights, and trademarks - are not
subject to levy and sale under execution, but, nevertheless, are a form of
intangible property for the purpose of a secured transaction. Because the
Umbro court's concern was primarily with the use of domain names in gar-
nishment proceedings, its decision is "superficially appealing" to the issue of
216correct classification of domain names.
Recognizing the shortcomings in the Umbro decision, a federal district
court in the Northern District of California in Kremen v. Cohen"1 7 declined to
adopt the majority's reasoning in Umbro.21 The Kremen court observed that
the Umbro decision fails to adequately analyze the issue of the correct classifi-
cation of domain names.219 The Kremen court, instead, found merit in the
dissenting position that the right to use domain names "exists separate and
apart from NSI's various services that make domain names operational
Internet addresses. These services are.., mere conditions subsequent."'
In Kremen, one of the plaintiff's allegations was that the defendant
converted the plaintiff's domain name, "sex.com."22 The Kremen court held
that the domain name "sex.com" is intangible property212 because it is not
942 (1881) ("debtor's interest in the patent rghts... cannot be taken on execution
at law"); Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. 528, 531, 14 How. 528, 14 L. Ed. 528 (1852)
(copyright "is not the subject of seizure or sale by means of' an execution, but it
"may be reached by a creditor's bill"); Stuzman v. C.A Nash & Son, Inc., 189 Va.
438, 446, 53 S.E.2d 45, 49 (1949) ("there is no property in a trade-mark" aside
from its use in a trade or business). But see McClaskey v. Harbison-Walker Re-
fractories Co., 138 F.2d 493, 500 (3d Cir. 1943) (allowing judgment creditor to
reach judgment debtor's patent by using writ of fieri facias).
Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86 n.13 (Va. 2000).
216. See Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (declining to
adopt reasoning of Umbro court).
217. 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
218. Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
219. Id. at 1173 n.2.
220. Id. (quoting Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 88-89 (Va.
2000) (Compton, S.J., dissenting)).
221. Id. at 1172-73.
222. In a later issued opinion, the Kremen court expanded its previous finding that a
domain name is a form of intangible property. The court cited to Yuba River Power Co. v.
Nevada Irrigation Dist., 279 P. 128, 129 (Cal. 1929), for the proposition that property includes
"everything which one person can own and transfer to another. It extends to every species of
right and interest capable of being enjoyed as such upon which it is practicable to place a money
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merged in or identified with a document or other tangible object.223 As intan-
gible property, a domain name cannot serve as a basis for a conversion claim
under California law.224 Only intangibles represented by documents, such as
bonds, notes, bills of exchange, stock certificates, and warehouse receipts, are
subject to conversion claims under California law.22 California law does not
recognize conversion of other intangibles, such as goodwill of a business,
trade secrets, a newspaper route, or a customer list.226 Because the defendant
effectuated the transfer of the plaintiff's domain name through the use of a
forged document, the court ordered NSI to restore registration of the
"sex.com" domain name to the plaintiff.227
In summary, an Internet domain name is not a proper subject of a conver-
sion claim.22 ' The lack of a conversion tort, however, is not uncommon for
most intangible property."' Moreover, trademarks are not separate property
rights. They are "integral and inseparable elements of the goodwill of the
business or services to which they pertain ... [and] ... goodwill is insepara-
ble from the business with which its is associated." 30 Thus, trademarks are
not chattel and not subject to conversion. Similarly, a trademark registration
cannot be bought or sold "in gross" apart from the mark and the goodwill
.associated with it. 2 31 A registration can be obtained only after the acquisition
value." Kremen v. Cohen, No. C 98-20718JW, 2000 WL 811403, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27,
2000).
223. Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1173; see also Domain Name CannotBe Converted, Wash.
Fed. Court Rules, 18 No. 3 ANDREWs COMPUTER & ONLINE INDUS. LmG. REP. 7 (Oct. 24,
2000) (reporting minute order entered by federal district court for Western District of Washing-
ton in case entitled Freel.net v. Freel Networks, Inc., No. COO-11 01Z (), holding domain names
are intangible property and, therefore, not subject to conversion tort under Washington law).
224. Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1172-73.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Kremen v. Cohen, No. C 98-20718JW, 2000 WL 1811403, at *4, *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
27,2000).
228. See Am. Bankers Mortgage Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 75 F.3d 1401,
1411 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating elements of conversion claim in California); Kremen v. Cohen,
99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (explaining that California law allows conversion
actions for certain intangibles, such as bonds, notes, stock certificates, and warehouse receipts
but not for goodwill of business, trade secrets, newspaper routes, or lists of customers); 5 B.E.
WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALFORNIA LAW, TORTS § 613 (9th ed. 1988) (explaining that, origi-
nally, tort of conversion was confined to tangible property).
229. See Miles Inc. v. Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 810 F. Supp. 1091, 1096 (S.D.
Cal. 1993) ("[lt is not uncommon for a person to have an intangible property right without a
cause of action in conversion to protect that right.").
230. VISA, U.SA., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 696 F.2d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1982).
231. Id. at 1375.
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of ownership by use. 2 Simply put, trademark registrations and applications
are not chattel and, thus, are not subject to conversion tort.233
Although domain names are not the proper subject of a conversion tort;
they, like other intangible property, can be used as collateral in secured transac-
tions. As discussed in Part m, trademarks and trademark applications are
"personal property" that can be used as collateral to secure payment or obliga-
tions under Article 9 of the UCC. Moreover, some domain names, unlike
trademarks, are valued highly in the open market irrespective of their attending
goodwill. These domain names, as noted above, are generic and memorable
words and, therefore, are not protected under the Lanham Act. The domain
names are valuable even without the attached goodwill, and, thus, they are
freely assignable and transferable.234 Consequently, domain names should be
recognized as intangible property for purposes of secured transactions."
232. See F.R. Lepage Bakery, Inc. v. Roush Bakery Prods. Co., 851 F.2d 351, 353 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (differentiating between collective marks and trademarks), withdrawn 863 F.2d 43
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
233. See id. at 351 (holding that trademark registrations are not chattel); see also VISA, 696
F.2d at 1371 (holding that trademarks "are not separate property rights").
234. Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999).
235. Presently, pursuant to the service agreement between NSI and a registrant, a registrant
may transfer domain name registrations to a third party of choice. Network Solutions Service
Agreement, 23, at http:/Awww.netsol.com/enUS/legal/service-agreement.jhtm (last visited
Oct. 26, 2001). NSI, however, forbids registrants assigning their rights under the Agreement,
and any attempt by the registrant's creditors to obtain an interest in registrant's rights under the
Agreement - whether by attachment, levy, garnishment, or otherwise - renders the Agreement
voidable at NSI's discretion. Id. This provision is self-contradictory. On one hand, registrants
have the right to transfer (read outright sale for value) domain names, and, on the other hand,
they are forbidden to obtain value for their domain names if they decided to use domain names
as collateral. The provision seems to serve as an attempt to follow the Umbro majority decision
prohibiting the use of domain names in garnishment proceedings. Such an attempt should be
narrowly drafted in order to avoid contradiction.
Further, such an attempt should abide by the Kremen court's determination that although
domain names are not property and, therefore, inapplicable subjects of conversion torts, domain
names are intangible property and can be transferred. As the Kremen court noted that NSI has
asserted repeatedly that domain names are a form of intangible property, NSI should not con-
tradict its assertion by prohibiting a registrant's creditors to obtain an interest in domain names.
See Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (explaining that NSI con-
tended that domain names are forms of intangible property); Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro
Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86 (Va. 2000) (noting that NSI acknowledged that right to use
domain name is form of intangible personal property). Moreover, § 9-408 of the UCC will gen-
erally render ineffective the transfer and assignment provision. Section 9-408 explicitly states
that an agreement that prohibits or restricts the assignment or transfer of, or creation, attach-
ment, or perfection of a security interest in a general intangible is non-efficacious. U.C.C. § 9-
408 (2001). See generally Jonathan C. Krisko, Recent Development, UCC Revised Article 9:
Can Domain Names Provide Security for New Economy Businesses?, 79 NCLR 1178 (2001)
(discussing security interests in domain names); Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitiza-
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3. Domain Names and the Relevant Federal Statute
Congress recently passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act (ACPA)"6 which authorizes in rem civil actions against a domain name
in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar or registry is lo-
cated."' Furthermore, a domain name's "situs" for jurisdictional purposes is
where "documents sufficient to establish control and authority regarding the
disposition of the registration and use of the domain are deposited with the
court."1
23
By recognizing a domain name as a "thing" for in rem civil actions, the
ACPA lends support to the classification of domain names as a form of intan-
gible property. 9 The ACPA provides that the remedies in these actions are
limited to an order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the
transfer of the domain name to the owner of the trademark.2' The ACPA
requires the registrar of the domain name to deposit with the court documents
sufficient to establish the court's control and authority regarding the disposi-
tion Transactions and the Bankruptcy Dynamic, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 287 (2001)
(discussing securitization of intangible assets).
236. The ACPA is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1999). See Anticybersquatting Con-
sumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 3001-3010 (1999) (authorizing certain civil
actions against domain names); see also Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489,
495 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting relevant legislative history on purpose of ACPA); Joel Voelzke,
New Cybersquatting Law Gives Trademark Owners Powerful New Weapons Against Domain
Name Pirates, 17 No. 2 CoMPULAW. 3,3 (2000) (explaining thatACPA "articulates a strong
federal policy against registering or keeping domain names for the main purpose of profiting
by selling those domain names to trademark owners or to people whose personal names are
similar to the domain name"). See generally Michael S. Denniston & Margaret Smith Kubiszyn,
www.yourclientcom: ChoosingDomain Names and Protecting Trademarks on the Internet, 61
ALA. LAW. 40 (Jan. 2000) (outlining basics of Internet domain name trademark protection);
Jeremy D. Mishkin, Master of Your Domain - An Overview of the Anticybersquatting Con-
sumer Protection Act 1 8-SPG CoMM. LAW 3 (2000) (discussing courts' previous treatment of
intellectual property disputes regarding domain names and new regime of ACPA).
237. See 15 U.S.C. § I 125(dX2XCXii) (1999) (stating that in rem suit can be brought in
judicial district where registrar is located or where "documents sufficient to establish control
and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain are deposited
with the court").
238. Id.
239. See Chertok & Agin, supra note 17, at 275 (observing that ACPA recognizes domain
names as intangible property for purposes of barring use of domain names, but fails to character-
ize domain names as assets that may be subjects of judicial liens).
240. 15 U.S.C. § ll25(dX2)(DXi) (1999). Procedurally, the trademark owner must deliver
a file stamped copy of the complaint to the registrar. The registrar then freezes the domain
name, except to transfer or cancel as ordered by the court. The registrar also must deposit the
domain name with the court. The court can grant only injunctive relief in the form of a for-
feiture, cancellation, or transfer of the domain name.
COMMERCLIL L, W COLLIDES WITH CYBERSPACE
tion of the registration and use of the domain name.24 The ACPA, as some
courts have observed, treats domain names as property or as having property-
like attributes.
242
For example, in Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace. Com243 the plain-
tiffbrought an in rem action against several domain names under the ACPA1 44
The defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint for lack of in rem juris-
diction, arguing that domain names are not proper "things" to serve as "res";
they are merely data that form part of Internet addresses and thus are not
property. 245  The court rejected the defendants' argument and held that
"[tihere is no prohibition on a legislative body making something property.
Even if a domain name is no more than data, Congress can make data property
and assign its place of registration as its situs. ''21 Indeed, courts routinely treat
domain names as property by ordering registrants to return domain names to
trademark owners.
247
The ACPA does not provide any guidance as to the assignment or
transfer of ownership in domain names or as to security interests in domain
names because Congress passed the Act solely for the purpose of eliminating
Act recognizes domain names as things" for the purpose of in rem jurisdic-
tion, it implicitly recognizes that domain names have become valuable
commodities in e-commerce.2" Undeniably, there are property interests in
241. Id.
242. See Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.Com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (E.D. Va.
2000) (treating domain names as property for purpose of in rem jurisdiction); see also Virtual
Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 271 (4th Cir. 2001) (affirming district
court's order to registrant Virtual Works to turn over "vw.net" to Volkswagen).
243. 112 F. Supp. 2d 502 (E.D. Va. 2000).
244. Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.Com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 502 (E.D. Va.
2000).
245. See id. at 504 (explaining defendant's argument).
246. Id. at 504.
247. See Virtual Works, Inc., 238 F.3d at 271 (affirming district court's order to registrant
Virtual Works to turn over "vw.net" to Volkswagen); Ford Motor Co. v. Lapertosa, 126 F.
Supp. 2d 463,468 (S.D. Mich. 2001) (ordering defendant to transfer fordrecalls.com to plain-
tiff); Simon Property Group, L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., No. IP 99-1195-CHIG, 2001 WL 66408,
at *20 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 24, 2001) (ordering defendant to transfer ownership and registration of
www.mysimon.com domain name and any other domain names owned by mySimon, Inc., to
plaintiff); Paccar, Inc. v. Telescan Technologies, L.L.C., 115 F. Supp. 2d 772, 780-81 (E.D.
Mich. 2000) (ordering defendant to transfer registration and ownership of several domain names
to plaintiff); Elecs. Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, No. Civ. A. 00-4055, 2000 WL
1622760, at *9 (E.D. Penn. Oct. 30, 2000) (ordering defendant to transfer group of domain
names to plaintiff).
248. See Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 498 (2d Cir. 2000)
(making reference to H.R. Rep. No. 106-412 (1999) at 5-7 (1999), S. Rep. No. 106-140, at 4-7
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 3 7 (2002)
domain names.249
V Securing Interest in Domain Names
A. Perfection Through Filing with the State
Section 9-310 of revised Article 9 of the UCC states that perfection of
security interests in collateral that do not fall within the enumerated excep-
tions in the provision3 ° is achieved through filing a financing statement with
(1999), and noting that purpose of ACPA is to stop cybersquatting conduct of demanding
ransom money from trademark owners to get their domain names back).
249. Other experts have recognized that although domain names are not property for the
tort of conversion, there are property interests in generic domain names. Professor Pamela
Samuelson has commented on the Kremen v. Cohen decision regarding the domain name "sex
corn": "(T]he Sex.com name is so commercially valuable that the notion it's not property
seems kind of crazy. But I'd be reluctant to say there's a property right in generic domain
names under existing law. Courts are usually careful to avoid judicially legislating something
this important." John Roemer, Web Domain Name Not Protected by Property Laws, US.
Judge Rules, INDUSTRY STANDARD (Dec. 15, 2000). Consequently, "it would seem preferable
to fashion other remedies, such as unfair competition, to protect people from having intangible
values used and appropriated in unfair ways." Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1174
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting W. PAGE KEETONET AL., PROSSER& KEETON ON TE LAW OF TORTS
§ 15, at 92 (5th ed. 1984)).
On the other hand, other experts believe that "elements of domain names are more similar
to real estate than to trademarks, and therefore, it would be economically efficient to grant
domain name owners stronger rights than those of mere trademark holders." Kenton K. Yee,
Location.Location.Location: Internet Addresses as Evolving Property, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISCI-
PLiNARY L.J. 201,201 (1997); see also Carl Oppendahl, Remedies in Domain Name Lawsuits:
How Is a Domain Name Like a Cow?, 15 J. MARSHAIL J. COMPUTRI & INFO. L. 437, 442-44
(1997) (suggesting domain name is property based on fact that domain names are capable of
being bought and sold).
250. The 2001 version of § 9-310(b) states that the filing of a financing statement is not
necessary to perfect a security interest in collateral:
(1) that is perfected under Section 9-308(d), (e), (f), or (g);
(2) that is perfected under Section 9-309 when it attaches;
(3) in property subject to a statute, regulation, or treaty described in Section 9-
311 (a);
(4) in goods in possession of a bailee which is perfected under Section 9-
312(dXl) or (2);
(5) or in certificated securities, documents, goods, or instruments which is
perfected without filing or possession under Section 9-312(e), (f), or (g);
(6) in collateral in the secured party's possession under Section 9-313;
(7) in a certificated security which perfected by delivery of the security certifi-
cate to the secured party under Section 9-313;
(8) in deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, investment property, or letter-
of-credit rights which is perfected by control under Section 9-314;
(9) in proceeds which is perfected under Section 9-315; or
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a state office.2" In most states, the appropriate filing office is the office of the
secretary of state.2" 2 Accordingly, the filing of a financing statement indicat-
ing the domain names as collateral with that office will ensure perfection of
the security interests in the domain names.3 Consequently, this raises a ques-
tion as to the state with which the secured party should file the financing
statement and which jurisdiction's choice of law will govern perfection rules
and effects of perfection. Revised section 9-301 provides that the law govern-
ing perfection of non-possessory security interests in intangible collateral,
whether perfected by filing or automatically, is the law of the jurisdiction of
the debtor's location.2"
In scenarios in which the debtor is located in one state and the collateral,
such as goods, documents, instruments, money, negotiable documents, and
tangible chattel paper as indicated in section 9-301(3), is located in a different
state, Article 9 has new multi-state rules.2" Under the new multi-state rules,
the state in which the debtor is located controls as to the place of perfection;
the state in which the collateral is located controls as to the rules of perfection
(10) that is perfected under Section 9-316.
U.C.C. § 9-310(b) (2001).
251. U.C.C. § 9-3 10(a) states, "Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and Section
§ 9-312(b), a financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests and agricultural
liens." U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (2001).
252. See U.C.C. § 9-501 (2001) (encouraging central filing for all collateral that is not
timber to be cut, minerals to be extracted, or fixtures).
253. See U.C.C. § 9-310 (2001) (setting guidelines for filing for perfection of security
interests). The author recognizes that in recent years, with the growth in e-commerce, many
trademarks have been used as domain names. In such instances, the domain names are still
trademarks and, thus, enjoy all the protection provided under Lanham Act. Further, perfection
of security interests in domain names that are trademarks follows the similar scheme for
perfection of security interests in trademarks.
254. Revised § 9-301 states in pertinent part:
[T]he following rules determine the law governing perfection, the effect of perfec-
tion or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, while a debtor is located in a jurisdic-
tion, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or
nonpeffection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral.
U.C.C. § 9-301 (2001). Official Comment 4 to section 9-301 states that "the law governing
perfection of security interests in both tangible and intangible collateral, whether perfected by
filing or automatically, is the law of the jurisdiction of the debtor's location." U.C.C. § 9-301
cmt. 4 (2001). "The general rule is subject to several exceptions .... Nor does it apply to
possessory security interests, i.e., security interests that the secured party has perfected by taking
possession of the collateral...." U.C.C. § 9-301 cmt. 5 (2001).
255. See U.C.C. § 9-301 & cmt 7 (2001) (providing that law of jurisdiction in which
collateral is located governs priority).
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and priority.2" 6 For example, if the debtor is located in Nevada and the collat-
eral is located in California, Nevada law will dictate which office, the office of
the secretary of state or the office of the county clerk, is the appropriate place
for the creditor to file the financing statement.? California law will govern the
rules of perfection and priority. In other words, California law will dictate how
perfection in such collateral can be achieved, whether through automatic
perfection at the time of attachment of the security interests in the collateral,
through the filing of a financing statement, or through possession of the collat-
eral, and how the rights of competing claimants to tangible collateral are re-
solved.
25
The above choice of law rule, however, only applies to goods, documents,
instruments, money, negotiable documents, and tangible chattel paper.259 Be-
cause domain names are not the type of collateral covered under the rule,
regardless of where domain names are "located," the law governing perfection
of security interests in domain names and effects of perfection or nonperfec-
tion is the law of the jurisdiction of the debtor's location.2'c
The debtor's location is determined by revised section 9-307. This sec-
tion states that ifthe debtor is an individual, the debtor's location is the individ-
256. U.C.C. § 9-301 cmt. 7 (2001). Comment 7 states:
Under former Section § 9-103, the law of a single jurisdiction governed both
questions of perfection and those of priority. This Article generally adopts that
approach. But the approach may create problems if the debtor and collateral are
located in different jurisdictions. For example, assume a security interest in
equipment located in Pennsylvania is perfected by filing in Illinois, where the
debtor is located. If the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located were
to govern priority, then the priority of an execution lien on goods located in
Pennsylvania would be governed by rules enacted by the Illinois Legislature.
To address this problem, paragraph (3XC) divorces questions of perfection
from questions of "the effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority of a
security interest." Under paragraph (3XC), the rights of competing claimants to
tangible collateral are resolved by reference to the law of the jurisdiction in which
the collateral is located.
U.C.C. § 9-301 cmt. 7 (2001).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. Domain names are general intangibles which are defined as "any personal
property, including things in action, other than... goods .... " U.C.C. § 9-102(42) (2001).
The state of the debtor's location governs the security interest in general intangibles that is
perfected. See Steven 0. Weise, PEB Report: Article 9 Perfection Choice of Law Analysis
Where RevisedArticle 91s Not in Effect inAlStates by July 1, 2001, 56 Bus. LAw. 1725, 1732
(2001) (discussing choice of law rules under revised Article 9 and former Article 9).
260. Because domain names are not the type of collateral covered under section 9-301(3)
as explained by the Official Comment 7, section 9-301(1) of the 2001 code will govern the
choice of law.
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ual's principal residence.; If the debtor is an organization and has only one
place of business, the debtor's location is its place of business, 2 and if the
debtor is an organization and has multiple places of business, the debtor's
location is at its chief executive office 263 Further, if a debtor is a registered
organization, the state that registered the organization is deemed as the place
at which the debtor is located.2"4 Accordingly, if the debtor is organized in
California, has its headquarters in San Francisco and its branch offices in
Ohio, Texas, and New York, the debtor's location is in San Francisco.
Consequently, if the debtor pledges domain names as collateral in secured
transactions, regardless of where the domain names are "located," California
law will govern perfection and priority.
Under the above analysis, a creditor will perfect its security interests in
a domain name by filing a financing statement with a state office in the state
in which the debtor is deemed located.265 The creditor, however, prior to
conducting such filing, needs to verify whether the debtor is indeed the owner
of the domain name as part of due diligence.2' This requires the creditor to
conduct a search with the WHOIS database.267 Upon such verification, if,
indeed the debtor is the owner of the domain name, the creditor may then
261. U.C.C. § 9-307(bXl) (2001) ("A debtor who is an individual is located at the individ-
ual's principal residence.").
262. U.C.C. § 9-307(bX2) (2001) ("A debtor that is an organization and has only one place
of business is located at its place of business.").
263. U.C.C. § 9-307(bX3) (2001) ("A debtor that is an organization and has more than one
place of business is located at its chief executive office.").
264. U.C.C. § 9-307(e) (2001) ("A registered organization that is organized under the law
of a State is located in that State.").
265. Cf Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 503 (1993) (noting common law rule that
intangible personal property is found at domicile of owner).
266. Moreover, under Article 9, perfection of security interests does not occur unless such
interests are attached against the debtor and other creditors. As a condition for attachment, the
debtor must have rights in the domain name collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-203(bX2) (2001) (stating
that security interest is enforceable against debtor and third parties if "debtor has rights in the
collateral").
267. Pursuant to the Registrar Accreditation Agreement between a registrar and ICANN,
a registrar must provide free public access to an on-line, interactive WHOIS database that
contains the names and contact information such as postal address, telephone number, electronic
mail address, and facsimile number, if available. See Register.corn, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F.
Supp. 2d 238,241-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining operation of WHOIS database). The public
can "collect registrant contact information for one domain name at a time by entering the
domain name into the provided search engine." Id. at 242. Individuals or entities that would
like to gain bulk access to the WHOIS database on a weekly basis must pay $10,000 yearly for
the license fee. Id. The primary purpose of the WHOIS database is to "provide necessary
information in the event of domain name disputes." Id. at 242.
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proceed with the filing of the financing statement indicating that the domain
name is being used as collateral.'"
This approach is inefficient because it requires the creditor to verify the
ownership of the collateral in one place (the WHOIS database) and to file the
financing statement covering the domain name at a different place (the office
of the secretary of the state in which the debtor is deemed located). Further,
it does not give notice to third parties who are accustomed to relying on the
WHOIS database for information relating to domain names, to determine if
the domain names have been encumbered.
B. Perfection Through Filing with the Registrar of
Domain Names
The purpose of perfection is to provide notice to third parties that the
collateral at issue has been encumbered.269 To fulfill that purpose, an efficient
approach to perfection would be a central filing for all security interests in
domain names. Thus, all security interests in domain names would be re-
corded in the WHOIS database. This system would provide any party who is
interested in a domain name easy access to all information regarding the
domain names. Most importantly, interested parties could conduct the search
electronically at any computer terminal with Internet access.27
Currently, the WHOIS database provides information about domain
names' registrants such as a registrant's identity, address, e-mail address, and
phone number." Adding the security interest information of particular
domain names into the WHOIS database would provide a "one-stop" service
to the public. Interested parties would not have to conduct two searches at
the office of the secretary of state and the WHOIS database.
268. See U.C.C. § 9-310 cmt. 2 (2001) (stating that filing provision "establishes a central
Article 9 principle: Filing a financing statement is necessary for perfection of security inter-
ests .... ").
269. See U.C.C. § 9-308 cmt. 2 (2001) ("[A]fter perfection the secured party is protected
against creditors and transferees of the debtor and, in particular, against any representative of
creditors in insolvency proceedings instituted by or against the debtor.").
270. See Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNHU L. REV.
134, 185 (1999) (recognizing third-party cost to discover secured interests on software and
suggesting that "[c]urrent technology should make it easy to design a filing system in which the
cost of filing would be quite low and in which competing creditors could discover the software
lender's interest easily, quickly, and without undue expense").
271. Register.con, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 242.
272. This is consistent with the primary purpose of the WHOIS database - providing nec-
essary information in the event of domain name disputes. See id. (explaining that purpose of
WHOIS database is to catalogue domain name ownership in event of dispute).
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Moreover, some interested parties may not know that they need to
conduct a search at the office of the secretary of state to ascertain whether a
domain name is free and clear from any security interest. They may not know
that they must obtain information about the debtor's location to conduct the
search in the appropriate state. Even sophisticated companies with the assis-
tance of legal counsel may encounter similar problems, given the fact that
Article 9 of the UCC is silent about domain names in the definitions of
various types of collateral, including the classification of domain names as
general intangibles."' Further, no court has had an opportunity to address the
issue of perfection of security interests in domain names. Moreover, the
ACPA, the only federal statute pertaining to domain names, falls short of
providing a means of using domain names to secure payment or obligation
incurred by Internet companies." 4
The ACPA treats domain names as "things" for in rem civil actions and
authorizes courts to seize domain names by forcing the registrar of the domain
name to "deposit with the court documents sufficient to establish the court's
control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of
the domain name."275 Courts, in several cases concerning in rem jurisdiction,
have held that domain names are property as legislated by Congress through
the ACPA.Va Consequently, the ACPA should be amended to provide a na-
tional, electronic filing scheme for security interests in domain names." The
273. See U.C.C. § 9-102(42) & cmt. 5d (2001) (defining general intangible category and
providing examples).
274. See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text (discussing nature of domain name
for purposes of determining property interests).
275. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(dX2)(DXi) (1999) provides in pertinent part:
The remedies in an in rem action under this paragraph shall be limited to a court
order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the
domain name to the owner of the mark. [Upon receipt of written notification of
a filed, stamped copy of a complaint filed by the owner of a mark in a United States
district court under this paragraph, the domain name registrar, domain name
registry, or other domain name authority shall -
(1) expeditiously deposit with the court documents sufficient to establish the
court's control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use
of the domain name to the court, and
(E) not transfer, suspend, or otherwise modify the domain name during the pen-
dency of the action, except upon order of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(dX2)(DXi) (1999).
276. See, e.g., Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.Com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 505 (E.D.
Va. 2000) (holding that assertion of in rem jurisdiction does not violate due process rights of
domain name owners).
277. The proposed amendment will preempt state regulations regarding perfection of secu-
rity interests in domain names. See U.C.C. § 9-311 & emt. 2 (2001) (explaining filing require-
ments).
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amendment should be drafed clearly to avoid the ambiguity of the federal
statutes governing trademarksY Such an amendment will preempt the filing
provisions of Article 9 of the UCC as stated in sections 9-109 and 9-311 .'9
Because all other information about domain names is currently in the WHOIS
database, the recording of security interests in domain names should be
included in the WHOIS database to reduce transaction costs and increase
search efficiency. The filing of the security interest in a domain name should
be recorded with the registrar that registered the domain name. The filing
should be done electronically to increase efficiency and minimize paper-based
resources.
, Further, this amendment to the ACPA would be a strong indication that
Congress recognizes the reality of the commercialization of domain names.
The amendment would give credence to the fact that domain names are treated
as corporate assets and would encourage the use of domain names along with
other intellectual property as collateral in commercial fnancing.2so
However, the approach is not without shortcomings. First, it may create
a monopolistic registrar out of NSI. NSI has been accused of monopolistic
behavior,"1 and although it is no longer the only registrar of domain names, 2
the company registered virtually all existing domain names in the ".com" Top
Level Domains through its original exclusive contract of registration with the
government. 3 Because most, if not all, Internet companies have their domain
names in the ".com" Top Level Domain, their creditors or lenders under this
proposed system would have to record their security interests in domain
names with NSI - the registrar that registered the domain names at issue. To
minimize monopolistic behavior, other registrars must be allowed to record
278. See supra notes 76-90 (interpreting Lanham Act trademark assignment provision).
279. See supra notes 56-58 (analyzing revised § 9-109 and § 9-311).
280. See Chertok & Agin, supra note 17, at 276-80 (criticizing existing case law as es-
poused by Virginia Supreme Court in Umbro for thwarting collection efforts of creditors seek-
ing to recover money judgments and relegating these creditors to status of unsecured creditors
in event of bankruptcy proceeding).
281. See Name.space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 582 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that NSI is entitled to implied conduct-based immunity with respect to its refusal to
add new gTLDs to root zone file in case in which plaintiff contested NSI's control of master
root zone server and file).
282. See id. at 577 ("NSI currently maintains the master root zone server, and was the sole
registrar for new domain names under the .com, .org, .net, .edu and .gov gTLDs."); Regis-
ter.corn v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 242 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining that NSI's
core business is maintenance of top-level domain names, servers, and zone files).
283. See Name.space, 202 F.3d at 577-79 (noting that NSI was sole registrar from 1993
through September 30, 2000, pursuant to Cooperative Agreement No. NCR-9218742 and its
Amendment No. 11).
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security interests in domain names."' They simply would record electroni-
cally the security interests in the "file" in the WHOIS database that contains
information about the domain name that would serve as collateral."'
Second, this approach will take away the fees associated with the filing
of the financing statements currently collected by state offices.? The volume
of the existing 1 and future domain names, if they are used as collateral in
secured transactions, ensures handsome fees for the state where the debtor is
deemed located. States may not want to relinquish this revenue stream.
VI. Conclusion
Domain names have become valuable corporate cyberassets. The use of
domain names in asset-backed securitization will become common practice in
corporate financing schemes. To facilitate such securitization, perfection of
security interests in domain names should be a simple process. An electronic,
national filing scheme for perfection of security interests in domain names
will provide notice to all third parties, reduce the transaction costs, and
increase efficiency.
Your VC client is waiting for your answers. You could take an easy way
out by informing the client that courts have not addressed the question of
284. See Register.com, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 241 (noting that there are more than fifty
registrars for domain names in .com, .net, and .org Top Level Domains).
285. With the advance of technology, it is possible to include domain name security inter-
est information in the WHOIS database. See Name.space, 202 F.3d at 579 (noting that ICANN
and Commerce Department entered into Memorandum of Understanding agreeing to collaborate
on "written technical procedures for operation of the primary root server including procedures
that permit modifications, additions or deletions to the root zone file").
286. Which entities will collect fees is a potentially sticky issue. The drafters of the revised
Article 9 were aware of this and left it to the legislators of each state to determine which office
will receive the financing statement filings and the associated fees. See U.C.C. § 9-501 (2001)
(leaving filing office blank for state to supply missing information). It is hard to imagine that
state governments will give up easily the potential fees to be collected from secwitization of
domain names.
Moreover, under the current domain name registration system, thirty percent of domain
name registration fees collected by registrars go into an "Intellectual Infrastructure Fund" for
future government use on Internet projects. Registrars have protested the thirty percent payment
as an unconstitutional tax Thomas et al. v. Network Solutions, Inc. & Nat'l Sci. Found., No.
97-2412 TFH, 1998 WL 1738180, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 1998). Whether the fees associated
with the filing of financing statements should be included in the calculation of domain name
registration fees, of which thirty percent will go to the Intellectual Infrastructure Fund, remains
for future debates.
287. Currently, there are about 20,000 domain names registered daily. A search conducted
on http'/whois.net/ on March 2,2001 showed 30,173,143 domain names registered. Five days
later, on March 7,2001, the number of registered domain names reached 30,285,017.
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whether domain names are intangible property for secured transaction pur-
poses and how security interests in domain names should be perfected. If
domain names are intangible property and Article 9 is the governing law, the
client has failed to perfect its security interests in the domain name collateral.
As an unsecured creditor, your client's chances of recovering the domain
name or the proceeds therefrom are very slim.
Or, you could attempt to explain to your client the archaic language of
Article 9, the classification of domain names, and federal preemption of per-
fection schemes. Federal preemption will occur only if Congress amends the
ACPA to provide a national, central, electronic filing of relevant documents
to indicate existing security interests in domain names. This system should
operate within the WHOIS database; it would make it easier for your client
not to lose its interests to the bankruptcy trustee.
